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ABSTRACT
Much has been written about the “overprotection” of trademark,
especially in the sports industry. Actionable trademark infringement
and dilution have been expanding, largely as a byproduct of the
trademark merchandising right. This relatively new-found right has
transformed the names, logos, catchphrases, and colors of sports
leagues and teams into commodities that can be monetized. Sports
entities and teams now possess near-monopoly control over a broad
swath of words and symbols. In abandoning trademark’s traditional
purpose to identify the source and origin of goods, current trademark
doctrine has harmed consumer welfare and competitive markets, and
bolstered private entitlements to language and iconography,
encroaching on freedom of expression.
The overprotection and commodification of sports trademarks have
taken especially strong hold in the United States, and less firmly in the
European Union and United Kingdom. However, five developments in
the US and abroad are now coinciding to provide an opportunity for a
timeout to reconsider the situation: (1) the growing unavailability of
suitable team names is complicating sports branding and rebranding;
(2) athletes are increasingly seeking to extend their intellectual
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property portfolios to trademark, further cluttering that space; (3)
Brexit has released the UK from the EU trademark regulatory regime
and jurisprudence that historically have been more protective than UK
law; (4) free speech values have gained purchase in opposition to
overprotective trademark doctrine, as evidenced in US Supreme Court
decisions and EU trademark reforms; and (5) the Trademark
Modernization Act of 2020 provides an opportunity to declutter the US
federal registry and reemphasize trademark use requirements.
This article compares the US, EU, and UK approaches to the
merchandising right and dilution doctrine, and the extent to which they
have strayed from trademark’s traditional functions. Against this
backdrop, the article examines the impact of overprotection on sports
industry stakeholders and consumers, and suggests new strategies and
spheres of compromise where looser conception and enforcement of
trademark will actually benefit all constituencies.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2021-22, two major US professional sports teams adopted new
names: the Major League Baseball (MLB) Cleveland Indians rebranded
as the Guardians, and the National Football League (NFL) Washington
Football Team further distanced itself from its former “Redskins”
moniker and rebranded as the Commanders.1 Trademark concerns
necessarily factored into both teams decision-making, including the
need to avoid similar names and logos in an increasingly crowded
sports marketplace.2 Even so, the Cleveland baseball team rebranding
was initially stalled by a trademark infringement action brought by a
local roller derby team that preceded use of the same name.3 Like the
roller derby team, the baseball team sought to invoke local history and
iconography in choosing a name and logo that pays homage to the
“Guardians of Traffic” statues located on the Hope Memorial Bridge
near the team’s stadium.4
Similarly, the Washington Football Team took eighteen months to
rebrand after dropping its former name, a process protracted by “legal
hurdles” the team encountered based on trademarks held by other

1. Cleveland changing name from Indians to Guardians after 2021 season,
ESPN (July 23, 2021), https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/31868331/clevelandchanging-name-indians-guardians; John Kelm, Washington selects Commanders as
new NFL team name after two-season process, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2022),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/33199548/washington-selects-commandersnew-team-name-two-season-search (reporting Native American pressure on the
Kansas City Chiefs to similarly rebrand).
2. Zachary Zagger, Wash. Team Rules Out ‘Wolves’ Name, Cites TM Legal
Hurdles, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.law360.com/articles/1452323/washteam-rules-out-wolves-name-cites-tm-legal-hurdles
(reporting
the
name
“RedWolves” was discarded because of use by college sports teams).
3. Guardians Roller Derby v. Cleveland Guardians Baseball Company LLC,
1:21-cv-02035 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2021). The case settled quickly, allowing both
teams to continue using the “Guardians” name. See Zachary Zagger, Cleveland MLB
Club Settles TM Suit Over ‘Guardians’ Rebrand, LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2021),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1440746/cleveland-mlb-club-settles-tm-suit-overguardians-rebrand.
4. Michael Shapiro, Here’s Why Cleveland Chose “Guardians” for New Team
ILLUSTRATED
(July
23,
2021),
Name,
SPORTS
https://www.si.com/mlb/2021/07/23/cleveland-guardians-name-change-decisionexplained.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2022

3

California
California
Western
Western
International
International
Law
Law
Journal,
Journal,
Vol.
Vol.
52,52,
No.No.
2 [2022],
2 [], Art.Art.
4 4

354 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
teams.5 For example, the Washington team scrapped the name
“RedWolves,” a fan favorite and in serious contention because of
continuity lent by the word “red,” after learning that a professional
minor league soccer team in Chattanooga, Tennessee was already
battling Arkansas State University over trademark rights to the same
name.6 In a procedural ruling in that dispute, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) noted how both entities used the
RedWolves name in conjunction with soccer teams, strongly suggesting
that the federal registry has raised the bar for sharing team names across
different geographic markets and levels of sport.7 Even with
RedWolves off the table, the Washington team still had to contend with
trademark squatters who had registered other potential new names to
shake down the team.8 Trademark law has clearly taken us far from the
day when multiple sports teams freely shared common names, with
trust in consumers and fans to differentiate.9
At the same time, increasing numbers of athletes and sports
personalities have registered their names, signature moves, and
5. Joe Rivera, Why Washington Football Team’s New Name Won’t be
(Jan.
4,
2022),
RedWolves
or
Wolves,
THE SPORTING NEWS
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/why-washington-football-teams-newname-wont-be-redwolves-or-wolves/3z4hlnfgw73y1ewg1n9hpf7q2.
6. See Complaint in Chattanooga Professional Soccer Management, LLC v.
Arkansas State University, No. 1:19CV00339 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.kark.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/85/2019/11/437202138-RedWolves.pdf (seeking declaratory judgment that professional soccer team can use
RedWolves name over opposition from Arkansas State University).
7. See Arkansas State University, Opposer v. Chattanooga Professional Soccer
Management LLC, Respondent, 2020 WL 702088 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. Feb.
11, 2020) (allowing ASU opposition to proceed against pro soccer team’s trademark
application for RedWolves).
8. Zachary Zagger, DC NFL Team Buys Time with Temporary Name Change,
LAW360
(July
23,
2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1294908?scroll=1&related=1.
9. See Ted Curtis & Joel H. Stempler, So What Do We Name the Team?
Trademark Infringement, the Lanham Act and Sports Franchises, 19 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 23, 29 (1995) (citing as examples the National Hockey League (NHL)
Winnipeg Jets and the NFL New York Jets, the NHL Los Angeles Kings and the
National Basketball Association (NBA) Sacramento Kings). For 27 years, St. Louis
was home to both the NFL Cardinals and the MLB Cardinals. See Ray Corio, Question
TIMES
(Feb.
12,
1990),
Box,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/12/sports/question-box.html.
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personal slogans as both trademarks and service marks.10 That trend
first gained public attention with the 1989 registration of “Three-Peat”
by Los Angeles Lakers head coach Pat Riley in anticipation of the
Lakers’ third consecutive NBA Championship.11 Public outcry soon
followed against this co-opting of what had been perceived as a generic
term.12 Yet the trend has only accelerated as athletes—now including
college athletes13—maximize their sports fame through intellectual
property exploitation. Thus, we see registrations like Greek Freak,
Beast Mode, Mr. October, and Paige Buckets for categories of goods as
varied as clothing, books, toys, sporting goods, sunglasses, and
educational services.14 While trademark protection is contingent on the
athletes ultimately using these marks in commerce—often a dubious
proposition—their existence in the registry creates barriers to entry in
both the specified categories and unrelated markets.15
10. Trademarks identify and distinguish the source and quality of tangible
goods, and service marks perform the same function for intangible services. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127.
11. See THREE-PEAT, Registration No. 1,552,980 (registered Aug. 22 1989 to
Riles & Co. Inc.). The Lakers did not win the championship that year, and not again
until 2000.
12. See Todd D. Kantorczyk, How to Stop the Fast Break: An Evaluation of the
“Three-Peat” Trademark and the FTC’s Role in Trademark Law Enforcement, 2
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 195, 196 (1995).
13. See Tan Boston, As California Goes, So Goes the Nation: A Title IX Analysis
of the Fair Pay to Play Act, 17 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 13 (2021)
(providing history of state legislation giving student-athletes the legal right to receive
compensation for use of names, images, and likenesses).
14. See GREEK FREAK, Registration No. 5401870 (registered Feb. 13, 2018
to NBA player Giannis Antetokounmpo); BEAST MODE, Registration No. 4582964
(registered May, 27, 2014 to NFL player Marshawn Lynch); MR. OCTOBER,
Registration No. 2594621 (registered July 16, 2002 to MLB player Reggie Jackson);
PAIGE BUCKETS, Serial No. 90826196 (application filed July 13, 2021 by college
basketball player Paige Bueckers); see also Doug Williams, Athletes Trademarking
the
Phrase
That
Pays,
ESPN
(Oct.
10,
2014),
https://www.espn.com/blog/playbook/fandom/post/_/id/6108/athlete-trademarksbecoming-commonplace.
15. For example, NBA superstar Giannis Antetokoumpo sued a mail-order
meal-delivery company to prevent it from selling a spice blend branded “Greek
Freak.” See Antetokounmpo v. Paleo Prods. LLC, No. 20-CV-6224 (JGK), 2021 WL
4864537, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2021) (after defendants failed to appear, court
awarded injunction but rejected statutory damages because of no likely confusion);
see also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 99 F. Supp.2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
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The ongoing controversy that epitomizes how far trademark has
traveled from its traditional functions is Ohio State’s attempt to register
the word “The” as a trademark.16 Over time, because its full formal
name under state law is “The Ohio State University,” the school has
made it a point of pride to emphasize “The.” In this tradition, NFL
players who went to Ohio State announced themselves in broadcasts
using the school’s full name and accentuating the definite article.17
Thus, the school sought to establish its exclusive right to use the standalone definite article—typically cited as the most common word in the
English language—as a trademark for apparel.18 Federal registration for
“The” was refused on the grounds that the specimen submitted to the
USPTO displayed a merely decorative or ornamental use that did not
indicate that Ohio State was the source of the shirt.19 But the USPTO
allowed that the school could overcome the refusal by submitting
evidence of acquired distinctiveness.20
These phenomena are in large part an outgrowth of the judicial and
later legislative establishment of a trademark merchandising right and
dilution cause of action—both of which have been the frequent and

(images of Tiger Woods are not protectible as trademarks unless capable of repeated
use in commerce as source indicator); infra note 121-24 and accompanying text.
16. THE, Application No. 88571984 (filed August 8, 2019 by The Ohio State
University). Ohio State has a history of aggressive trademark enforcement, for
example, opposing an online store’s application to register the phrase “Hang on
Sloopy” for merchandise like mugs and T-shirts, because it is the name of a 1960s
pop song that the school’s marching band famously plays during football games. See
Bill Donahue, Brand Battles: Ohio State, ‘Purple Haze,’ ‘Wizard Of Oz,’ LAW360
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1132041/brand-battles-ohio-statepurple-haze-wizard-of-oz-.
17. Morgan Moriarty, Why creative intros became a primetime football norm,
and why everybody calls their alma mater ‘THE’ now, SBNATION (Sept. 9, 2018,
5:00 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2018/9/9/17402796/player-introductionsprimetime-football-nbc-sunday-night-football (noting that players from other
colleges have added the emphatic “the” upfront.
18. Bill Donahue, Can Ohio State Register The Word ‘The’ As A Trademark?,
LAW360 (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1188495/can-ohio-stateregister-the-word-the-as-a-trademark-.
19. See THE, USPTO Nonfinal Office Action, Reference/Docket No.
0539066 (Sept. 11, 2019).
20. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. 1052(f).
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longstanding subject of scholarly criticism.21 These doctrines have had
special purchase in the sports industry, which generated some of the
earliest case law establishing their contours.22 In combination, these
doctrines have transformed the names, logos, catchphrases, and even
colors of sports leagues and teams into commodities that can be
monetized.23 Sports leagues and teams now possess near-monopoly
control over a broad swath of words and symbols.24 In abandoning
trademark’s traditional purpose to identify the source and origin of
goods, the commodification of trademark has harmed consumer welfare
and competitive markets, and bolstered private entitlements to language
and iconography, encroaching on freedom of expression.25
Trademark law’s historical focus has been to promote free and fair
competition in the market for goods and services by facilitating
consumer access to truthful information.26 Under a traditional
trademark regime, unaffiliated third parties would be free to
21. See generally Kenneth L. Port, The Commodification of Trademarks: Some
Final Thoughts on Trademark Dilution, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 676 (2017)
(collecting literature critical of the federal Trade Dilution Act); Mark A. Lemley &
Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 (2010); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005); J. Gordon Hylton, The Over-Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights in Sport in the United States and Elsewhere, 21 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 43 (2011); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY
L.J. 367 (1999); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960
(1993).
22.
See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979); Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap &
Emblem Manufacturing, Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975).
23. See Port, supra note 21, at 675. Although this phenomenon is especially
present in sports, it occurs across other industries as well. See Irene Calboli, The Case
for A Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 868
(2011) (noting Harley-Davidson logo-ed merchandise); Kozinski, supra note 21, at
961 (noting Grateful Dead logo-ed merchandise).
24. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 50; Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra
note 21, at 422.
25. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 21, at 422; Daniel J. Hemel
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Trademark Law Pluralism, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1025,
1038-39 (2021) (suggesting that the supply of words and symbols that make for strong
trademarks is dwindling); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94
IOWA L. REV. 49, 77 (2008) (describing the “chilling effect” of trademark doctrines
on free speech).
26. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 463.
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manufacture and sell shirts with team logos as long as they accurately
identified the source and origin of the goods and avoided creating
“consumer confusion.”27 They would not be liable for ornamental or
expressive “non-trademark use” of logos.28 Common sports team
names would be available across different product and geographic
markets.29 Familiar fan locutions would reside in the public domain
available for cultural appropriation and recodification.30

27. “Consumer confusion” is the sine qua non of a trademark infringement
claim under Lanham Act § 43(a), which imposes liability on “[a]ny person who, on
or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which … is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person….” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
See also Lanham Act § 32, which imposes liability on “[a]ny person who … use[s] in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive….” 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2018).
28. See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 1977, 1981 (2019) (arguing against trademark protection for marks that do not
function to identify source or origin); Margreth Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The
Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liability to Uses “In the Manner of
a Mark,” 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893 (2008) (“‘Trademark use’ can be generally
understood as use of a word or symbol in close association with goods or services
being offered for sale, in a manner that is likely to communicate the source of those
goods or services to consumers”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion
Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007)
(explaining that a trademark use approach to infringement claims operates “as a
threshold filter, requiring courts to engage in a preliminary inquiry regarding the
nature of that use, thereby downgrading any analysis of its effects on consumer
understanding”).
29. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 182 -83.
30. See Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections
on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free
Speech Norms, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 530 (1997); Joseph P. Liu, Sports
Merchandising, Publicity Rights, and the Missing Role of the Sports Fan, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 493, 513 (2011).
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This approach needed to change, however, for the sports industry
to capture the economic value of trademarks as commodities.31 It did so
through a judicial and legislative expansion of property rights in
trademarks, largely contrived by the sports leagues themselves.32 At
this point, decades of judicial decisions have presumed that any use or
display of sports industry marks will invariably confuse consumers,
justifying a radical expansion of trademark protection and, in circular
fashion, creating the modern consumer expectation that such use is
authorized by the team.33 Legal protection of this practice across all
industries has effectively converted the consumer welfare orientation of
US trademark law into “a form of corporate welfare.”34 The result for
sports fans is that they have no alternative but to buy high-priced
“authorized” goods and curtail their expressions of allegiance to their
teams.35 Also at stake is the availability of language for both
competitive market entry (trademark) and expressive (non-trademark)
uses.36
Across the Atlantic, European Union and United Kingdom laws
have not traveled the full distance to the commodification of
31. The global market for licensed sports merchandise was estimated at $34.3
billion in 2020. See Global Licensed Sports Merchandise Market Report 2021:
Market to Reach a Revised Size of $49.8 Billion by 2027, PRNEWSWIRE (June 18,
2021),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-licensed-sportsmerchandise-market-report-2021-market-to-reach-a-revised-size-of-49-8-billion-by2027—301315552.html.
32. See Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and Beyond:
Antitrust Law’s Limited Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from Professional Sports
Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. REV. 901, 908-909 (2012) (collecting cases).
33. See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49
IDEA 1, 35 (2008) (“The more courts presume that consumers expect every use of a
trademark to be licensed and condemn unlicensed uses, the more this presumption
will become a reality.”); Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 21, at 396-97
(describing the “circular” reasoning that leads consumers to expect sports badges of
allegiance to originate from the league or team).
34. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get
Trademark Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2018).
35. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 21, at 398; see Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 21, at 482.
36. See Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 25, at 1038-39 (suggesting
that the supply of words and symbols that make for strong trademarks is dwindling);
McGeveran, supra note 25, at 77 (describing the “chilling effect” of trademark
doctrines on free speech).
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trademark.37 Courts there have taken a narrower view of the
merchandising right and dilution doctrine.38 Provisions of the European
Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR) have been invoked to
delineate the traditional functions of trademark, in particular to refuse
registration of marks devoid of “distinctive character” and to permit
overlapping registrations in some situations.39 And UK courts that
apply the “trademark use” and “distinctiveness” doctrines to sports
merchandising have suggested that trademark protection should attach
only where it serves to guarantee the origin of the goods.40
Five developments in the US and abroad, in part concentrated in
the sports industry, are now coinciding to provide an opportunity for a
timeout41 to reconsider the overprotection of trademark. First, the
37. See Port, supra note 21, at 685 (describing the US as the “world leader” who
“has led other countries into an abyss where trademark rights are unlimited, where
competition is irrelevant, and where the objective is to commodify and hypothecate
the trademark”).
38. See Manchester United Football Club Ltd. v. Sega Publishing Europe Ltd.
& Anor [2020] EWHC 1439 (Ch) (June 4, 2020) 111 TMR 641; Intel Corporation
Inc. v CPM United Kingdom Ltd, C-252/07, 62007CJ0252 (Nov. 27, 2008 EUCJ), ¶
71.
39. See infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text; Commission Regulation
2017/1001 of 16 June 2017 on the European Union Trade Mark (consolidated version)
O.J. (L 154) 1-99 [hereinafter EUTMR] Art. 7(1)(b), available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1506417891296&uri=CELEX:32017R1001. Although the
English and European styling is to write “trade mark” as two words, rather than
“trademark,” this article will use the latter except when quoting an English or
European case, statute, or regulation.
40. See Rugby Football Union v. Cotton Traders Ltd [2002] EWHC 467 (Ch);
[2002] E.T.M.R. 76; [2002] (Ch D) (rejecting infringement claim against apparel
manufacturer who sold unlicensed classic rugby jerseys similar to RFU rugby rose
because rose is national emblem associated with support of England team); Arsenal
Football Club PLC v. Reed [2001] RPC 922 (trial court accepted street vendor’s
argument that he sold soccer shirts bearing team logos as a “badge of allegiance” and
not to designate origin), referred to the ECJ, Case C-206/01, judgment dated 12
November 2002, back to Chancery Division, [2002] EWHC 2695 (ch), appeal upheld
[2003] EWCA Civ 96 (overturning trial court based on European Court of Justice
interpretation of EU law with the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European
Union, the force of that ruling may decline.)
41. A timeout in sports is when a team stops the clock and game to, among other
things, go over game strategy and play. See Football Timeouts, ROOKIE ROAD,
https://www.rookieroad.com/football/101/timeouts/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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growing unavailability of suitable team names complicates sports
branding and rebranding.42 Second, as athletes increasingly seek to
extend their intellectual property portfolios to trademark, they further
clutter that “linguistic space.”43 Third, Brexit has released the UK from
an EU trademark regulatory regime and jurisprudence that historically
have been more protective than UK law, enabling UK courts to revert
to a more traditional view of trademark.44 Fourth, free speech values
have gained purchase in opposition to overprotective trademark
doctrine, as evidenced in US Supreme Court decisions and EU
trademark reforms.45 Fifth, the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020
(TMA) provides mechanisms and incentives to declutter the US federal
registry and reemphasize trademark use requirements.46 These
developments suggest an opportunity for trademark here and abroad to
converge at a level of legal protection that better serves all
constituencies.
Part II of this article tells the story of sports trademarks over the last
half-century and describes their special significance as badges of
identity and allegiance. It further examines how the expansion of
trademark in the US has reified marks and logos beyond protecting
against consumer confusion, focusing on the sports industry as a stark
example of this phenomenon. Part III compares the approaches to
trademark rights in the European Union and the United Kingdom,
which offer pockets of resistance to overprotection of trademark, again
focusing on the sports industry. Part IV explains how the overprotection
of trademark has disserved sports fans and consumers and undermined
competitive markets and access to language and iconography. It argues
42. See infra notes 274-86 and accompanying text.
43. Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 25, at 1039 (observing that
common US surnames available for trademark registration is dwindling).
44. See infra notes 190-228 and accompanying text.
45. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech Challenges to Trademark Law After Matal
v. Tam, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 415 (2018) (arguing that trademark laws are speech
regulations subject to First Amendment scrutiny). Reforms to the EUTMR enacted in
2016 require trademark rules to be “applied in a way that ensures full respect for
fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression.”
EUTMR Recital 21.
46. Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (TMA), Pub. L. No. 116-260, §§
221-28, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1066a (allowing for ex parte
expungement of a mark never used in commerce).
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that the existing trademark regime, while ostensibly favoring sports
industry mark owners, can backfire on them and impose unanticipated
costs and consequences. Reflecting on the five cross-border
developments mentioned above and the EU and UK approaches, this
Part suggests new strategies and spheres of compromise where looser
conception and enforcement of trademark rights will actually benefit
the sports industry, and its fans and consumers. The article concludes
with why the sports industry, in particular, should support reforms that
serve the public good.
I. UNITED STATES OVERPROTECTION OF SPORTS TRADEMARKS
Sports leagues and teams are primarily in the business of producing
sporting events. Under traditional trademark theory, their names and
symbols would be protected to the extent necessary to prevent
confusion as to the true identities of the contesting teams or the hosting
league.47 Over time, however, sports team names and symbols came to
possess special significance beyond serving as identifiers of the athletic
contests and events that fans love to watch. Fans began to purchase
merchandise displaying sports trademarks to express their support for
their teams and to identify with a like-minded community.48 Fans
bought these items with the understanding that the teams themselves
are not in the business of producing consumer goods, but rather a thirdparty manufacturer, authorized or not, is the source of the logo-ed
merchandise or apparel.49 That manufacturer imprints its own label on
the sports merchandise to serve the core trademark function of

47. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 48; see, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro.
Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship., 34 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
confusion based on consumer survey evidence that football fans mistakenly thought
“Baltimore CFL Colts,” a new Canadian Football League club, was either the former
NFL Baltimore Colts or the Indianapolis Colts).
48. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 49-50.
49. See Matthew B. Kugler, The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1911, 1913 (2017).
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indicating source or origin.50 The sports marks themselves are the
product, or at least more product features than brands.51
Consumers buying sports merchandise as a badge of allegiance
initially had only incidental concern for the quality or source of the
underlying goods. Even if concerned about quality, consumers were not
relying on the sports logo, as opposed to the manufacturer’s label, to
communicate that feature of the merchandise.52 It mattered not to the
New Orleans sports fan whether Nike or Reebok manufactured the
shirt, only that it displays the logo of the Saints football team or declares
“Who Dat?”53
Accordingly, in the early days of sports trademark merchandising,
producers who manufactured and sold logo-ed items without team or
league permission risked claims not for trademark infringement, but for
“false advertising” and similar unfair competition torts.54 As long as the
goods displayed a conspicuous disclaimer, an unaffiliated manufacturer
ostensibly could continue its business without tort or trademark
liability.55 Eventually trademark owners, sports leagues first among
them, awakened to the economic value of merchandising and set out to
capture that value through formal arrangements and litigation.
The first league out of the gate was the NFL, which in 1963 formed
NFL Properties “to act as licensing representative for the trademarks
and other commercial identifications of the member clubs.”56 Major
50. See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark
Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 362 (2007) (observing that protection of trademark
merchandising relies in part on the theory that “trademarks represented product source
‘at large,’ that is, the source ‘controlling’ the products regardless of the actual
manufacture”).
51. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 472.
52. See Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of NonTrademark Uses of Sports Logos, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 283, 305 (2004).
53. See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1262
(describing trademark litigation over ownership of the Saints fan chant “Who Dat?”).
54. Hylton, supra note 21, at 47-48.
55. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 489 (recommending the use of
disclaimers to dispel confusion in trademark merchandising); see also University of
Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 495
US 1087 (1982) (university failed to object to unauthorized use of sports team name
and logo over a period of 36 years).
56. Nat’l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532
F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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League Baseball created a similar entity in 1966, and in 1969 induced
Topps Chewing Gum Company to officially license use of MLB team
names and trademarks on its baseball cards even though its cards had
depicted those marks without a license for decades.57 The other major
leagues—the National Basketball Association (NBA) and National
Hockey League (NHL)—soon followed in forming business units
tasked with, among other things, exploiting and enforcing member
clubs’ trademark rights.58
A. Commodifying Trademark Through the Merchandising Right
To protect their investment, sports leagues and teams took litigation
advantage of earlier re-theorizing of trademark law from deceptionbased to property-based.59 The Fifth Circuit in 1975 delivered a seminal
victory for this theory in Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc. There, the court ruled in favor of
the NHL and its member teams against an unlicensed manufacturer of
sew-on emblems depicting team marks.60 It is worth first recapping the
district court ruling in that case, after a bench trial, which found no

57. See Hylton, supra note 21, at 48; Dave Jamieson, Mint Condition: How
Baseball Cards Became an American Obsession 90 (ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
2010). While trading card manufacturers routinely contracted with ballplayers to use
their images, until the advent of trademark merchandising protection, they assumed
they could depict the players in their logo-ed uniforms without separately licensing
those marks. See Bowman Gum v. Topps Chewing Gum, 103 F. Supp. 944, 946
(E.D.N.Y. 1952); J. Gordon Hylton, Baseball Cards and the Birth of the Right of
Publicity: The Curious Case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 273, 279 (2001). MLB Properties now exclusively licenses
league and team logos to a preferred trading card company, and pursues infringement
claims against unlicensed card manufacturers who assert nominative fair use. See,
e.g., Complaint in Major League Baseball Properties Inc. v. The Upper Deck Co.
LLC, case number 10-cv-00732 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2010) (No. 10-cv-00732), and
Defendant Upper Deck’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010).
58. Mitten, supra note 32, at 902 (recounting the history of the formation of
sports league properties subsidiaries).
59. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 21, at 372-73.
60. Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1014 (5th Cir. 1975) [Boston Pro Hockey 2].
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infringement based on a traditional approach to trademark.61 The
district court reasoned that “ornamental” sports emblems did not
operate as trademarks when affixed to ancillary goods such as hats.62
Rather, the court characterized the designs as “functional,” creating a
demand for the product “unrelated to its feature as an indica of
source.”63 Supporting this conclusion was a trial record that lacked
evidence of confusion or that consumers expected an affiliation
between the emblem seller and the hockey teams.64
Importantly, the district court emphasized that the hockey designs
were not copyrighted and that, under trademark, were entitled only to
“the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s
goodwill against the sale of another’s product as his.”65 The district
court refused to grant protection to a trademark as the “product itself”
because it would be “tantamount to a copyright monopoly”—but far
broader, as copyrights expire while trademarks are perpetual as long as
used in commerce.66 Instead, the district court held that “the protection
of the trademark law must give way to the public policy favoring free
competition.”67 That is, a consumer-focused trademark law prioritizes
the greater variety and lower prices afforded by allowing unlicensed
products to compete with licensed versions.68
While rejecting the trademark infringement claim, the Boston
Professional Hockey district court found that the emblem sellers’
actions constituted unfair competition.69 The district court invoked its
equity powers to require the emblem seller to place on its goods an
appropriate disclaimer of affiliation with the hockey league, to ensure
61. Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F.
Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975) [Boston Pro Hockey 1].
62. Id. at 463.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 462 (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 US 359, 368 (1924)).
66. Id. at 464.
67. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2018).
68. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 481 (observing that “nonconfusing
uses of marks on merchandise serve rather than impede competition in the
marketplace and thus promote the overall goals of trademark and unfair competition
law”).
69. Boston Pro Hockey 1, 360 F. Supp. at 465.
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the public’s right to know the origin of the goods and avoid any
appropriation of the league’s and teams’ goodwill.70
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit in Boston Professional Hockey
bushwhacked a new path for trademark protection, cutting through
established precedent and the lower court trial record to hold that
duplication of NHL team marks constitutes both trademark
infringement and unfair competition warranting injunctive relief.71 The
circuit court found “irrelevant” and clearly erroneous the district court’s
record-based rejection of confusion as to who manufactured the
physical articles.72 Instead, it held that “confusion is self-evident from
the nature of defendant’s use”:
The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the
trademark symbols were in [the NHL and its teams] satisfies the
requirement of the [Lanham Act]. The argument that confusion must
be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is
unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by the team, is the
triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem.73

This assertion by the Fifth Circuit collapses the distinction between
the trademark and the underlying goods and rests the holding on a
tautology: if consumers recognize the emblem as a team symbol then
that emblem is “the triggering mechanism” for the purchase and
establishes confusion.74 By “equating recognition with confusion,”75
the Fifth Circuit effectively presumed confusion as a matter of law
rather than the factual record.76 Acknowledging that its ruling “may
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the public
to the protection of the [sports league’s] business interests,” the court
70. Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles,
90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2182-83 (2004) (proposing limiting relief in merchandising
cases to disclaimer remedies).
71. Boston Pro Hockey 2, 510 F.2d at 1012.
72. Id. at 1012.
73. Id. The Fifth Circuit similarly rejected the lower court’s characterization of
the marks as “functional” because their association with the hockey teams and not
their “aesthetic characteristic” triggered sales. Id. at 1013.
74. Boston Pro Hockey 2, 510 F.2d at 1012.
75. Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 607 (1984).
76. Boston Pro Hockey 2, 510 F.2d at 1012.
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offered the circular justification that professional sports created the
commercial value of the emblems and now routinely exploit it
themselves.77 The court thus deemed a disclaimer inadequate to protect
fair competition,78 and conferred the very “trademark monopoly”
abjured by the district court.79
A 1977 Fifth Circuit decision attempted to walk back the Boston
Professional Hockey rationale, stating that “[o]ur cases demonstrate
unbroken insistence upon the likelihood of confusion, and by doing so
they reject any notion that a trademark is an owner’s ‘property’ to be
protected irrespective of its role in the operation of our markets.”80
Other courts similarly rejected the implications of Boston Professional
Hockey. The Ninth Circuit, for example, refused to endorse it and
describing it as “an extraordinary extension of the protection heretofore
afforded trademark owners.”81 However, those judicial disavowals of

77. Id. at 1011. Possibly concerned about too radical a reorientation of
trademark law, the Fifth Circuit restricted the presumption of confusion “to the
emblems sold principally through sporting goods stores for informal use by the public
in connection with sports activities and to show public allegiance to or identification
with the teams themselves.” Id.
78. Id. at 1013.
79. Boston Pro Hockey 1, 360 F. Supp. at 464; see Lunney, Trademark
Monopolies, supra note 21, at 396; see also Assaf, supra note 33, at 35 (arguing that
by assuming disclaimers are inadequate, courts create the public perception that
ornamental trademark use must be authorized and that “the signs of modern culture
are private possessions and sources of economic gain for their owners”); see also
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 672 n.19 (5th Cir.
2000) (suggesting that disclaimer remedies best advance First Amendment interests).
80. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1977).
81. Int’l Ord. of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th
Cir. 1980) (finding functional use of fraternal emblems does not infringe trademark);
see also United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000) (criticizing
Boston Hockey for “rel[ying] upon a novel and overly broad conception of the rights
that a trademark entails”); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.Com, Inc., 177 F. Supp.
2d 635, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (in anti-cybersquatting claim over automobile domain
names, rejecting the “implication in [Boston Professional Hockey] that trademarks are
themselves ‘goods or services’”); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp.
1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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Boston Professional Hockey involved trademarks outside the sports
industry.82
Inside the sports industry, protection of team marks as property
took firm decisional hold, often based on theories of free-riding, unjust
enrichment, and misappropriation.83 A leading example is NFL
Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc., in which an Illinois
court enjoined a different emblem seller from unlicensed manufacture
and sale of emblems bearing NFL team marks.84 The court held that the
NFL and its clubs were entitled to control merchandising of the marks
by virtue of their “expenditure of large sums of money” and “extensive
licensing arrangements.”85 The court rejected a disclaimer remedy
because it would be inadequate to avoid unjustly enriching an emblem
seller who was free-riding on the league’s investment in establishing
secondary meaning and goodwill in the marks.86 In Boston Athletic
Ass’n v. Sullivan, the First Circuit upheld the Boston Marathon host
entity’s exclusive right to refer to the race in shirts for sale, expressing
concern about the defendant obtaining a “free ride at plaintiffs’
expense.”87 As a result of such decisions, sports outstrips other
industries as “one of the most pervasive of the merchandising
domains.”88

82. See Supreme Assembly, Ord. of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co.,
676 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing sports trademarks from fraternal
emblems).
83. See, e.g., Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1546
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding infringement solely because of the “public’s knowledge that
the trademark . . . originate[d] with the plaintiff”); NFL Props., Inc. v. Consumer
Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); NFL Props., Inc. v. Dall. Cap &
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n v.
Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 USPQ 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
84. NFL Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1975).
85. Id. at 245-56.
86. Id. at 247.
87. Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989)
(“Defendants’ shirts are clearly designed to take advantage of the Boston Marathon
and to benefit from the good will associated with its promotion by plaintiffs.”); see
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 147 (observing that the overprotection of
trademark merchandising reflects concern about free-riding and market preemption).
88. See Kugler, supra note 49, at 1933.
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B. Dilution and Sponsorship Protection for Sports TM
Parallel to these trademark merchandising cases, sports
organizations sought to further reify their marks as property through
sponsorship and dilution claims. An important victory came in 1979 in
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.89 There,
the Second Circuit enjoined a pornographic film featuring a performer
attired as a Dallas Cowboy cheerleader on the ground that use of the
uniform would create confusion as to sponsorship or approval, which
in turn would harm the mark owner’s reputation.90 Among this ruling’s
most problematic turns, the court rejected the argument that no
reasonable person would believe the film originated with the team.
Rather, without any record evidence of confusion, the court banned the
film based on the likelihood that the public would think the team
“approved” it.91 In doing so, the court rejected the First Amendment
defense that the filmmaker was entitled to use the trademark to engage
in social commentary.92 Instead, the court likened trademark to private
real property, relying on Supreme Court precedent involving shopping
centers to approve restrictions on expressive uses of trademark so long
as there were “alternative” avenues available to the speaker.93 Sports
marks owners could thereafter rely on this ruling to protect against
unwelcome expressive use.94

89. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 205.
91. Id. at 204-205.
92. Id. at 205-206; see Assaf, supra note 33, at 67.
93. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206, citing Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 US 551, 567 (1972) (approving restrictions on expressive activities on
shopping center premises so long as alternative fora were available to the speaker).
94. See Corp. of Gonzaga Univ. v. Pendleton Enters., LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1319,
1329 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (rejecting nominative fair use of university team marks
because radio station and bar could find other ways of communicating their services);
NBA Props. v. Untertainment Recs. LLC, No. 99 Civ. 2933 (HB), 1999 WL 335147,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1999) (enjoining record label parody of NBA logo because
it associated basketball league with guns and drugs); Nat’l Football League Props.,
Inc. v. New Jersey Giants, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 507, 510 (D.N.J. 1986) (rejecting First
Amendment “right to comment” defense in enjoining shirt manufacturer’s use of
“New Jersey Giants”).
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Congress codified judicial protection of sponsorship rights in the
1988 amendments to the Lanham Act, authorizing infringement actions
beyond source deception to encompass trademark uses that might
suggest “affiliation, connection, or association” or “origin, sponsorship,
or approval.”95 True to trademark, the amendment retained the
requirement that an unauthorized use “is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.”96 And before and after that legislative
move, some sports trademark decisions insisted on evidence of actual
“sponsorship confusion” over whether the league or its teams licensed
or approved the offending goods.97 But the 1988 amendments
nevertheless greatly expanded the nature of the harms for which
trademark owners could pursue relief, fueling propagation of farreaching liability theories such as “post-sale” confusion experienced by
non-purchasers who see a sports fan wearing unauthorized
merchandise, even if the purchasing fan was not confused at the time of
purchase.98
These judicial and legislative victories emboldened sports league
trademark legal demands. In the 1990s, MLB expanded its campaign to
require nonprofit youth leagues and minor leagues whose teams use
MLB names, to purchase uniforms and equipment only from MLB-

95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Bd. of Gov. of Univ. of N. Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp.
167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (requiring evidence that consumers viewed trademark use
as indicia of sponsorship); Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls
Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 661 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (relying on evidence of
defendant’s intent to create sponsorship confusion by deceptive placement of
disclaimer labels); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 476-77.
98. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 21, at 152 (noting that post-sale
confusion mainly occurs in the context of luxury goods); Kahn, supra note 52, at 305
(arguing that post-sale confusion should not be available to sports mark owners
because the logo does not perform a quality assurance function); see, e.g., Adidas
Am., Inc. v. Payless ShoeSource, Inc., No. CV 01-1655-KI, 2008 WL 4279812 (D.
Ore. Sept. 12, 2008) (jury verdict awarding over $300 million to shoe manufacturer
for discount shoe retailers use of similarly striped basketball sneakers). Other newfound sources of harm include “initial interest confusion” and “endorsement
confusion,” neither of which necessarily requires proof that the mark holder lost any
sales or suffered any competitive injury. See Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of
Trademark Infringement?, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627, 627 (2016).
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licensed vendors.99 Even when the teams used only the names and not
the official logos, MLB insisted they buy the more expensive licensed
goods, causing a Chicago youth league in 2008 to stop using MLB team
names.100 When MLB threatened litigation that same year against six
teams in the amateur Cape Cod League, two teams changed their names
in order to stay loyal to local uniform vendors, while four kept their
major league names and agreed to purchase through the licensed
vendor.101
The 1995 Trademark Dilution Act pushed trademark law further
towards a property right by discarding the confusion requirement
altogether for “famous marks.” Owners of famous marks could bring
dilution claims against uses that blur their distinctiveness or tarnish
their reputation, and obtain injunctive relief regardless of confusion.102
Arguably, the marks of all US major league professional teams are
famous, entitling them to this high level of protection.103

99. See Bill Haltom, Little League Ballplayers Need Major League Trademark
Lawyers, TENN. B.J., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 25, 25 (criticizing MLB’s requirement that
youth teams use officially licensed vendors); Michele Himmelberg, Little League
Outfits Causing Quite a Stir, DENV. POST, Apr. 23, 1994, at C5, available at Factiva,
Doc. No. dnvr000020011029dq4n007k3 (reporting that the licensed-vendor
requirement imposes costs on these leagues that many cannot afford to bear).
100. See Mike Masnick, Stephen Colbert Takes on MLB’s Attempt to Bully Little
Leaguers with Trademarks, TECHDIRT (May 30, 2008, 9:39 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080529/2344361265.shtml;
contra Keegan
Girodo, Lookalike Logos: Is A High School’s Use of A Logo or Insignia Similar to
That of A University A Violation Under the Lanham Act, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
463, 472 (2018) (observing that the NFL permits high schools to freely borrow its
team names and logos to inspire youth football engagement).
101. Katie Thomas, In Cape Cod League, It’s Tradition vs. Trademark, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
23,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/sports/baseball/24capecod.html.
102. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat.
98515 (1996) (protecting against use that “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark”); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Although dilution is a recent addition to the federal
statute, it has existed at common law and in various state statutes for many years.
103. A famous mark is one that is “widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services” and
exhibits famousness factors such as: (i) the duration and reach of publicity of the mark,
(ii) the volume and extent of sales, (iii) actual recognition of the mark and (iv) meeting
of procedural criteria regarding registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). See Assaf,
supra note 33, at 32 (noting the fame of sports and university marks).
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Famous marks acquired even greater protection in the 2006
amendments to the Lanham Act, which relaxed the standards for
establishing dilution to require only a “likelihood of dilution,” rather
than actual dilution.104 The amendments also clarified that not only was
“confusion” irrelevant to a dilution claim, but the trademark owner did
not even need to show that the offender competed with the owner in any
way or that the owner suffered any economic injury.105 In the sports
world, this led to claims like that of the University of Florida against a
private K-12 day school located about 300 miles downstate, whose
athletic teams used a gator logo similar to the university’s.106 Although
the day school had been using its gator logo for over 50 years and in no
way competed with the university, it spent $60,000 to change the logo,
as litigation would be even more costly.107
Sports trademark coverage expanded again in Board of Supervisors
for Louisiana State University v. Smack Apparel Co., a 2008 Fifth
Circuit decision that granted protection to team color combinations and
phrases commenting on the team, even when unregistered.108 The
defendant in that case, Smack Apparel, manufactured shirts that
commented on the relative football prowess of Louisiana State
University, University of Oklahoma, Ohio State University, and the
University of Southern California, all plaintiffs in the case.109 Using
color schemes similar to those of the universities, Smack Apparel shirts
displayed phrases such as “Bourbon Street or Bust,” “Beat Oklahoma,”
and “Got 8?/We Do! Home of the 8 Time National Champions.”110 By
eschewing official logos, Smack Apparel had hoped to “operate[] in the
104. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–312, 120 Stat.
1730 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2018)).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 494
(observing that “Merchandising uses do not blur the distinctive significance of a mark
in the mind of consumers. Rather, they reinforce it.”).
106. Adam Himmelsbach, Colleges Tell High Schools Logos Are Off Limits,
TIMES
(Nov.
26,
2010),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/27/sports/football/27logos.html.
107. Id. (reporting multiple incidents of universities bullying high schools to
change logos).
108. Bd. of Supervisors for L.S.U. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Smack Apparel].
109. Id. at 471-72.
110. Id. at 472-73.
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shadows of Boston Professional Hockey” under the assumption that it
could thereby avoid infringement claims.111 That assumption turned out
to be misplaced, as the universities sued to protect their own lucrative
licensing deals.112 In assessing whether consumers would be confused
by Smack Apparel’s use, the Fifth Circuit again relied on the tautology
that the “desire by consumers to associate with a particular university
supports the conclusion that team colors and logos are, in the minds of
the fans and other consumers, source indicators of team-related
apparel.”113
In its defense, Smack Apparel argued functionality and expressive
fair use, namely, that university colors on its shirts serve: (a) the
functional purpose of bonding the wearers as a community and
declaring school loyalty, and (b) the expressive purpose of identifying
the universities as the subject matter of the shirts’ messages.114
Rejecting these arguments, the court instead construed them as
admissions of bad faith, namely that Smack Apparel’s use was
“designed to create the illusion of affiliation with the Universities and
essentially obtain a ‘free ride.’”115
Other litigation victories emboldened universities to seek
protection well beyond institutional marks and colors, encroaching on
the use of popular catchphrases and similar expressions of support for
sports teams.116 Texas A&M University notoriously sued two NFL

111. Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1254.
112. Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 485.
113. Id. at 478. Tellingly, the court observed “[w]hether or not a consumer cares
about official sponsorship is a different question from whether that consumer would
likely believe the product is officially sponsored.” Id. at 485. But it is the court’s own
rulings that have generated widespread consumer belief about official sponsorship.
114. Id. at 486-90.
115. Id. at 483.
116. See Calboli, supra note 23, at 883–84; see, e.g., Texas Tech Univ. v.
Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510, 520 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (presuming confusion where
defendant sold products using university team colors and logos and identified them as
officially licensed after expiration of that license); cf. Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 565
F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1254 (D. Kan. 2008) (presuming confusion as to products with
“striking similarities” to university marks); Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art
Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (allowing artist to reproduce
football team uniform in artistic painting but not in promotional products displaying
the painting); but see University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d
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teams—the Seattle Seahawks and the Indianapolis Colts—for using the
phrase “12th Man” in marketing campaigns.117 The university had
obtained a trademark registration for the phrase in 1989, even though it
is commonly used to refer to football fans cheering for the eleven
players on the field.118 The university withdrew the suits only when the
NFL teams agreed to license and pay royalties for use of the phrase.119
The Seattle Seahawks then took a page from the Texas A&M playbook
and proceeded to claim trademark rights in variations on the phrase,
including “12” and “the 12s.”120
Athletes also got into the game of registering stock catchphrases,
finding that such trademarks are “rarely, if ever, refused on the basis
that they are informational slogans or lack distinctiveness.”121 Thus, for
a period, basketball coach John Calipari owned the phrase “Refuse to
Lose,” baseball player Ernie Banks owned the phrase “Let’s Play Two,”
and football player Bart Scott owned the phrase “Can’t Wait.”122 Even
though it was the fans, press, or social media who attached such phrases
to these sports celebrities, they felt compelled to assert ownership to
“stake their territory defensively to avoid exploitation by others.”123 In
1040 (3rd Cir. 1982) (laches deprived university of remedy for past unauthorized use
of sports team name and logo, but could pursue prospective relief ).
117. See Zachary Zagger, Texas A&M Drops Indianapolis Colts ‘12th Man’ TM
Suit, LAW360 (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/760593/texas-a-mdrops-indianapolis-colts-12th-man-tm-suit.
118. Tyler Hood, Who Claims to be the Real 12th Man?, WAKE FOREST J. BUS.
& INTELL. PROP. L. (Nov. 8, 2015), http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2015/11/who-hasthe-real-12th-man/.
119. See Zagger, supra note 117.
120.
See Bill Donahue, Football Fights: The NFL’s Litigious Year at The
TTAB, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/886789/footballfights-the-nfl-s-litigious-year-at-the-ttab.
121. Alexandra J. Roberts, Athlete Trademarks: Names, Nicknames, and
Catchphrases, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 478 (Michael
A. McCann ed., 2018) (describing the experience of athletes and coaches who register
trademarks for the control it affords).
122. REFUSE TO LOSE, Registration No. 2048577 (registered Apr. 1, 1997 to
University of Kentucky basketball coach John Calipari); LET’S PLAY TWO,
Registration No. 1886002 (registered March 28, 1995 to former Chicago Cubs
shortstop Ernie Banks); CAN’T WAIT, Registration No. 4247527 (registered
November 20, 2012 to New York Jets linebacker Bart Scott).
123. See Roberts, supra note 121, at 486; Antetokounmpo v. Costantino, No.
21CV2198JMFJLC, 2021 WL 5916512, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2021), report and
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esports, gamers are advised to register their pseudonyms, known as
“tags,” as a negotiating tool to leverage against team, leagues, and
sponsors seeking their services or attempting to avoid contract
obligations.124
Claims proceeded to multiply by universities, sports teams, and
athletes alleging that unauthorized use of common sports imagery and
fan locutions will cause confusion as to affiliation or approval.125 These
include:
•

West Virginia University claimed that a manufacturer of
blue and gold shirts emblazoned with “Let’s Go! Drink
Some Beers!” infringed its rights in the phrase “Let’s Go
Mountaineers,” despite that blue and gold are the official
state colors and the words “Mountaineers,” “WVU,” and
“West Virginia University” did not appear on the shirts.126

•

University of Delaware demanded that two undergraduates
cease and desist their plans to sell T-shirts at home-coming
bearing the slogan “U can suck our D,” despite the use of a
different font than the interlocking UD logo used by the
university.127

recommendation adopted sub nom. Antetokounmpo v. Constantino, No. 21-CV-2198
(JMF), 2022 WL 36232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022) (adopting rationale that use of Greek
Freak and athlete’s image would necessarily lead consumers to assume he sponsored
the products).
124. See John Bat, Pre-Game Strategy for Long-Term Win: Using Trademark
Registration and Right of Publicity to Protect Esports Gamers, 29 CATH. U.J.L. &
TECH. 203, 222 (2020); Scott M. Sisun, The Ball Is in Your Court: An Update on
Trademarks (and Copyright) in Sports (the Work), ENT. & SPORTS L., Summer 2017,
at 21, 24.
125. See also James Boyle, Jennifer Jenkins, Mark of the Devil: The University
as Brand Bully, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 391, 393 (2020);
Keegan Girodo, Lookalike Logos: Is A High School’s Use of A Logo or Insignia
Similar to That of A University A Violation Under the Lanham Act, 28 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 463, 482 (2018) (describing how college athletic programs no longer demand
same-name high school teams cease and desist, but instead bully them into licensing
the college trademarks).
126. Jacob H. Rooksby, University: Trademark Rights Accretion in Higher
Education, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 378 (2014).
127. Id. at 379.
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•

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
claimed that the use of the terms “Final 3” and “April
Madness” by a sports entertainment services company
infringed and diluted its Final Four and March Madness
marks for the annual Division I college basketball
tournament.128

•

The NFL demanded New Orleans street vendors stop
selling unlicensed shirts featuring the Saints’ “Who Dat?”
cheer, extracting concessions in a litigation settlement
despite public protest that the saying belongs to the city and
is in the public domain.129

•

The NHL sued to stop a company from selling clear plastic
beer steins that resembled the Stanley Cup championship
trophy, although it did not depict any NHL names or logos,
and disclaimed affiliation with the league.130

•

Champion boxer Jeff Lacy, nicknamed “Left Hook,” sued
an oil company that used common boxing themes,
including that phrase, to promote its business and store
brand products.131

And, as mentioned earlier, the chutzpah award goes to The Ohio State
University, which in 2019 tried to register the word “The” as a
trademark.132 In most of these cases, the mere threat of litigation was
128. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Kizzang LLC, 304 F. Supp. 3d 800, 803
(S.D. Ind. 2018).
129. Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc., Civ. A. Nos. 10-1333, 10-2296,
2012 US Dist. LEXIS 46733, at *2-3 (E.D. La. 2012); see Lauren A. Fields, Who
Owns Dat?, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 251, 253 (2010) (describing how fans
have been using the “Who Dat?” chant since the 1980s and that it is shortened version
of a phrase from a musical recording: “Who dat say dey gonna beat dem Saints?”).
130. Nat’l Hockey League v. Hockey Cup LLC, No. 18CV6597(DLC), 2019
WL 130576, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss infringement
claims).
131. Lacy et al v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., No. 1:18CV01346, ¶¶ 33-35 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 30, 2018).
132. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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sufficiently chilling that the unaffiliated users abandoned their projects
and identifiers, despite potentially valid defenses of lack of confusion,
fair use, and free speech.133
That brings us to the point that US consumers now expect that all
merchandise bearing sports names, logos, colors, and catchphrases are
necessarily licensed or authorized by the teams and leagues,
accomplishing the commodification of trademark in that industry.134
Not surprisingly, commodification across all industries has incentivized
applications for trademark registration, with the number of trademark
applications reaching an all-time high of 943,928 in 2021, double the
number of filings just two years earlier.135 Search and clearance costs
imposed by this trademark clutter will raise barriers to market entry,
further harming consumer welfare.136
C. Prospects for Pushback: the First Amendment and the Trademark
Modernization Act of 2020
Given extensive criticism of this situation, one would expect some
pushback by the parties most aggrieved: consumers and competitors. It
has not arisen largely because of the “standing” anomaly in trademark
law, which authorizes only trademark owners to bring a lawsuit.137
Because consumers do not have standing to sue, their interests are often
underrepresented, despite the law’s ostensible focus on consumer
133. Rooksby, supra note 126, at 412 (observing that the very existence of these
trademark registrations “serves to clutter the commercial market, chill competition,
and cause risk aversion by well-intentioned individuals and companies”).
134. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 486 (“consumers might assume a
licensing relationship in the context of some famous marks, particularly in the field of
professional sports”); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661,
1668 (1999) (observing that professional sports trademark owners’ rights “now seem
well-secured” based on the circularity of litigation outcomes and licensing practices);
see also Kugler, supra note 49, at 1915 (reporting results of survey that consumers
consider sports team sponsorship material to their merchandise purchasing decisions).
135. USPTO,
Trademark
Dashboard,
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboard/trademarks/. That number represents a 43%
increase from 659,000 filings in 2020, and a 90% increase from 459,000 filings in
2019.
136. See Gundersen, et al., Trademark Trends, 33 No. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J. 3 (June 2021).
137. See Kahn, supra note 52, at 289.
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welfare.138 Collective action issues further deter competitors who might
have standing from investing in a challenge to the status quo.139 Courts
consequently fall victim to a “framing bias” leading to decisions that
fail to reflect “the substantial welfare gains that increased competition
brings to consumers.”140 That bias has led a US retreat from regarding
trademarks as part of a trade regulation system that protects markets,
and toward a property rights system that protects owners.141 In circular
fashion, the expansion of the property right has propelled aggressive
enforcement efforts, even beyond the owner’s established markets, as
these efforts can be offered as evidence of a stronger mark.142
Scholars have identified some prospect for weakening this cycle in
two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions, at least insofar as
trademark doctrine implicates First Amendment interests.143 In Matal
v. Tam144 and Iancu v. Brunetti,145 the Court invalidated provisions of
the Lanham Act that prohibited the registration of “disparaging” marks
138. See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 11992000 (remarking how courts rarely ask “How do I rule so that consumers prevail?”);
cf. Complaint in Santos v. National Football League, 3:22-cv-00855 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
9, 2022) (consumer class action alleging that the NFL, its teams, and major licensing
partner violate the antitrust laws by prohibiting sale of NFL-licensed products through
third-party online marketplaces that offer lower prices).
139.
See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 125253; cf. Complaint in Casey’s Distributing, Inc. v. National Football League, 3:21-cv09905, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2021) (merchandise seller antitrust action alleging that the
NFL conspired with its major licensing partner to monopolize distribution of its
licensed products).
140. See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1204.
141. Id. at 1247.
142. See Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-ofPublicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1319 (2016) (observing that trademark owners
send cease-and-desist letters and pursue litigation “not because they risk losing their
marks” if they do not enforce, “but because their rights will be more valuable if their
objection succeeds”).
143. Jennifer E. Rothman, Valuing the Freedom of Speech and the Freedom to
Compete in Defenses to Trademark and Related Claims in the United States, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE TRADEMARK LAW 537, 553-55
(Irene Calboli & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2020); Mark A. Lemley, Fame, Parody, and
Policing in Trademark Law, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 17 n. 53 (2019); Ramsey,
supra note 45, at 423.
144. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
145. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
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and “immoral” or “scandalous” marks.146 These provisions violated the
First Amendment because they empowered a government actor—the
USPTO—to restrict and discriminate against speech based on its
content or the speaker’s viewpoint.147
Drawing on the Court’s rationale in these cases, Lanham Act
provisions that allow broad registration of virtually any word or symbol
arguably overstep the First Amendment by chilling the use of “a
descriptive term, popular slogan, informational phrase, culturallysignificant symbol, color, representational shape, or other inherently
valuable product feature that is deemed to have acquired
distinctiveness.”148 Tam and Brunetti could also fuel First Amendment
challenges to trademark enforcement provisions. Dilution laws are
especially vulnerable because they regulate expression based on the
content of a junior use and whether it deviates from a famous mark’s
preferred branding message. Lisa Ramsey has argued that constitutional
analysis of dilution may well be “fatal” to the extent that this trademark
enforcement mechanism stifles non-misleading commercial
expression.149
In addition, the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 offers
potential to declutter the federal registry and to reemphasize the
requirement of use as a trademark.150 Regulations that became effective
in December 2021 created new ex parte expungement and
reexamination proceedings to provide a faster, more efficient, and less
expensive alternative to a contested inter parties cancellation
proceeding.151 The process is available to anyone, not just interested
parties, and the USPTO may also initiate proceedings sua sponte.152 The
USPTO’s statement accompanying the regulations reflects an
enforcement approach with the potential to elevate consumer welfare
over property rights. Concern is expressed about the “cluttering” of the
registry and the difficulty legitimate businesses face in clearing and
146. 15 U.S.C. §1052(a).
147. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1747, 1751; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2300.
148. See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 427.
149. Id. at 456-460.
150. Trademark Modernization Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, §§ 221-28,
134 Stat. 1182 (2020) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1066a).
151. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.91.
152. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.92.
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registering marks.153 Expungement petitioners are not required to
identify the real party in interest, to avoid discouraging legitimate
petitions by those who fear retaliation, and to invite participation by
those who otherwise would not have standing.154
Whether either First Amendment or expungement challenges will
effectuate change is still a matter of speculation, as the US continues to
outstrip other industrial nations in commodifying trademark.
II. EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED KINGDOM TRADEMARK NORMS AS
APPLIED TO SPORTS TRADEMARKS
European intellectual property norms offer insights into whether
there is a possibility of resisting or reversing these trends. The
trademark laws of the European Union and United Kingdom resemble
those in the US in their basic objective of protecting distinctive symbols
as indicators of commercial origin to inform and facilitate consumer
purchasing decisions.155 However, sufficient conceptual differences
exist to offer a counterpoint in the treatment of trademark
merchandising and dilution. This article addresses EU and UK law
separately because the British exit from the EU may revive some of that
nation’s singular approaches to trademark protection.156 Although
historically other member states’ approaches to trademark law were
also diverse, they, unlike the UK, will necessarily continue to

153. Changes To Implement Provisions of the Trademark Modernization Act of
2020, 86 F.R. 64300.
154. Id. at 64308. One missed opportunity in crafting the Act is that it limits the
grounds for expungement and reexamination to failure to use the mark in commerce
and does not allow revisiting whether a mark should be cancelled for lacking
distinctiveness. Id. at 64302.
155. Annette Kur, Convergence After All? A Comparative View on the US and
EU Trademark Systems in the Light of the “Trade Mark Study,” 19 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 305, 306 (2012).
156. See Introduction to Annual Review of EU Trademark Law, 111
TRADEMARK REP. 506 (2021) (noting that at the December 31, 2020 conclusion of the
Brexit transition period, the UK is no longer subject to EU trademark law, although
its Trade Marks Act 1994 was compliant with EU law at that date).
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harmonize their law through the Trade Mark Directive (TMD),157 and
the European Union Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR).158
As background, a dual system exists for trademarks in Europe,
providing for registration at both: (1) the EU level as a European Union
Trade Mark (EUTM) with the European Union Intellectual Property
Office (EUIPO), and (2) the national level as a national trademark with
the intellectual property office of individual EU member states.159 The
introduction of the EUTM created a single, unitary right effective
throughout the EU, while the TMD’s harmonization process has
alleviated the burden of divergent national trademark laws on the
operation of the single market.160 At the same time, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) has produced a body of jurisprudence
that interprets and delineates the regulatory framework.161
157. Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 2015, to Approximate the laws of the Member States Relating to
Trademarks,
O.J.
(L
336)
1-26,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L2436 [hereinafter TMD]. The TMD
obliges EU member states to harmonize their laws so as to conform with its
provisions.
158. Commission Regulation 2017/1001 of 16 June 2017 on the European
Union Trade Mark (consolidated version) O.J. (L 154) 1-99, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?qid=1506417891296&uri=CELEX:32017R1001[hereinafter
EUTMR]. In parallel with the harmonization of EU intellectual property law, the
TRIPS Agreement established international minimum standards for protecting and
enforcing IP rights, which go beyond the subject of this article. Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results
of
the
Uruguay
Round
vol.
31,
33
I.L.M.
1197
(1994),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.
159. ROLAND KNAAK, ANNETTE KUR, AND ALEXANDER VON MÜHLENDAHL,
THE STUDY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM 3 (Nov.
1, 2012); Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research
Paper No. 12-13, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2172217.
160. S.M. Maniatis, Whither European Trade Mark Law? Arsenal and
Davidoff: The Creative Disorder Stage, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 99, 100
(2003).
161. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) comprises two
courts—the Court of Justice and the General Court—and “constitutes the judicial
authority of the European Union and, in cooperation with the courts and tribunals of
the Member States, it ensures the uniform application and interpretation of EU law.”
The
Institution,
Court
of
Justice
of
the
European
Union,
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A. European Union Trademark Norms and Reforms
A number of provisions of the EUTMR are especially relevant to
the discussion of the overprotection and commodification of trademark,
first and foremost its approach to registration. EU trademark protection
is acquired by registration alone.162 Unlike US trademark law, the mark
does not have to be used in commerce at the time of registration,
although it can be invalidated if it has not been put to genuine use within
five years.163 In this sense, EU law “places more emphasis on the
proprietary aspects of trademark protection” than US law.164 However,
EU rules provide for absolute refusal of registration if the mark is
devoid of any distinctive character; may serve to designate the quality,
value, geographical origin or other properties of the goods or services;
or has become customary in bona fide trade.165 While permitting
registration without use potentially “clutters” trademark registers, the
absolute refusal grounds offer some protection against the co-opting of
generic, descriptive, or customary designations.166
In practice, the EUIPO registration rulings appear informed by just
such concerns about commercial linguistic scarcity, especially in the
sports setting. Accordingly, it rejected trademark registrations of
“World Hockey Association,” “World Cup,” and “European Cricket
Network” as merely descriptive and devoid of distinctive character.167
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/en/; see also Maniatis, supra note 160, at
99.
162. EUTMR Art. 9(1).
163. EUTMR Art. 18, Art. 64(2).
164. Kur, supra note 155, at 306.
165. EUTMR Art. 7(b)-(d).
166. Kur, supra note 155, at 315.
167. CTM Application No. 003237931, World Hockey Association (Aug. 18,
2005, TM Department OHIM) (noting a Google search of the words generated over
27,000 hits, establishing wide trade usage); Ferrero OHG mbH v. Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), R1466/2005-1 (June 20, 2008, 1st
Board of Appeal OHIM) (holding that non-distinctive names “must remain available
for competitors”); EUTM Application No. 017944715, European Cricket Network
(Oct. 16, 2018, Operations Department EUIPO); see also EUTM Application No.
015182728, Tennis World Cup (May 24, 2016, Operations Department EUIPO)
(rejecting registration of “Tennis World Cup”); CTM Application No. 006900997,
Int’l Tennis Hall of Fame (October 31, 2008, TM Department OHIM) (rejecting
“International Tennis Hall of Fame” for trademark protection in the category of tennis
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In contrast, the US approach readily grants exclusive registration to
marks that contain descriptive terms, as long as they are capable of
becoming distinctive at some future point.168 Thus, the USPTO allowed
registration of “The Cheerleading Worlds” by the U.S. All Star
Federation, which used it as a basis to sue other cheerleading
competitions that incorporated the terms “World” and “Worlds” in their
titles.169
The EUIPO’s regard for competitive access to language is further
evident in its decisions allowing multiple uses of similar team names.
It permitted the registration of a German football club mark “AFC Lions
1987” over opposition by the NFL’s Detroit Lions, and registration of
the mark “Chicano Bulls” over opposition by the NBA’s Chicago
Bulls.170 The NBA was permitted to register an EUTM for the New

museum, but registering mark in the category of retail and gift store products bearing
that
name).
EUIPO
decisions
are
all
available
at
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en.
168. While the Lanham Act contains a presumption against registration of a
mark that is “merely descriptive” or “primarily geographically descriptive,” a mark
can overcome that presumption and enjoy registration if it acquires the requisite
distinctiveness, i.e., secondary meaning, over time. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e), (f); 1091(a).
Compare Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 08-60554-CIV, 2009 WL
10668763, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2009) (barring junior use of “Little League”
because it is no longer merely descriptive and has become distinctive over time), with
In re Major League Baseball Players Alumni Ass’n, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(permitting registration of “Major League Baseball Players Alumni Association” over
MLB’s objections, because name being used only descriptively). See also Alexandra
J. Roberts, How to Do Things with Word Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of
Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (2014) (arguing for the USPTO and
TTAB should apply a stricter standard for distinctiveness to “preserve competitors’
ability to communicate information about their goods and protect consumers’ access
to knowledge about new or lesser-known products”).
169. Complaint in U.S. All Star Fed., Inc. v. Open Cheer & Dance
Championship Series, LLC, No. 21-cv-02135, ¶¶ 16-17, 30-31 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21,
2021).
170. NFL Props. Europe GmbH v. 1. FCC Braunschweig e.V., R184/2016-2
(Oct. 20, 2016 2d Board of Appeal EUIPO) (limiting registration to categories of
goods not previously registered by the Detroit Lions); NBA Props., Inc. v. Haijiao
Qiu, R2164/2017-4 (June 20, 2018, 4th Board of Appeal EUIPO) (permitting
registration for all goods except bags).
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Orleans Pelicans, over the opposition a German company that held the
trademark in Pelikan.171
The CJEU decision in the widely reported Messi case confirms a
more permissive approach to overlapping registrations.172 Soccer
superstar Lionel Messi sought to use his last name as an EUTM for
categories such as clothing and gym equipment.173 The CJEU permitted
the use, rejecting an opposition based on the existing registration of
“Massi” for the same class of goods. In analyzing the likelihood of
confusion, the CJEU looked not to the public at large, but to whether
consumers of sporting goods and sports clothes would mistake the two
names.174 Based on Messi’s global fame, the answer was no, indicating
a willingness by the CJEU to trust that consumer sophistication can
counteract visual and phonetic similarities in trademarks.175
A second EUTMR provision relevant to the commodification of
trademark is the right of a mark with “a reputation in the Union” to
prohibit dilution caused by another’s use of identical or similar signs.176
As in the US, this anti-dilution law does not require likelihood of
confusion or that the offending use involve similar products or
services.177 However, CJEU interpretation of the dilution provision has
rendered this cause of action less advantageous to mark owners,
especially sports teams and leagues, than its US analog.178 That’s
171. Pelikan Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v. EUIPO (NBA Props.,
Inc.), R408/2016-4 (Sept. 12, 2018 General Court).
172. EUIPO v. Lionel Andrés Messi Cuccittini, Case C-449/18P and P J.M.E.V. e hijos v. Lionel Andrés Messi Cuccittini, Case C-474/18 (CJEU, September 17,
2020) (Google translated version) [hereinafter Messi].
173. Messi, ¶ 7.
174. Messi, ¶ 36.
175. Messi, ¶ 53; see Annual Review of EU Trademark Law, III. Conflict with
Earlier Rights-Relative Grounds for Refusal of Registration, 111 TRADEMARK REP.
549, 566 (2021).
176. EUTMR Art. 9(2)(c); see also Art. 8(5) (refusing registration of a mark
that dilutes an existing mark).
177. Id.
178. Granted the CJEU applies a more lenient standard for establishing
“reputation” (i.e., famousness), requiring only that the mark is “known to a significant
part of the relevant sectors of the public,” while in the US a mark must be “widely
recognized by the general consuming public.” Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) with
General Motors Corp. v. Yplon, 1999 E.C.R. I-5421, ¶ 44 (1999). However, this
distinction would be meaningless to US sports teams and leagues, which arguably
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because the CJEU has interpreted the regulation to require that the
trademark owner prove actual, rather than likelihood of dilution.179
Actual dilution is further defined as “actual and present injury to its
mark, … or a serious likelihood that such an injury will occur in the
future.”180 With the actual dilution requirement, the EU has declined to
adopt the US grant of vast property rights to famous mark owners.181
Yet, overall, the harmonization of European trademark law
expanded its scope and strengthened the legal position of rights
holders.182 In this regard, EU law converged somewhat with US law in
elevating trademark protection to the detriment of its societal goals of
promoting consumer welfare, competitive markets, and sequential
innovation.183 Scholars of EU trademark law have expressed concerns
regarding free expression that mirror those in the US, namely, that
holders of marks with strong reputations could use EU law to deter
criticism, comment, and parody that may adversely affect brand image
and goodwill, even in the absence of consumer confusion as to
source.184
The 2016 reforms to the EUTMR alleviated these concerns to a
degree by reorienting some European trademark norms.185 EU
possess the necessary fame to qualify for protection under either standard. See supra
note 103 and accompanying text.
179. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) with Intel Corporation Inc. v CPM United
Kingdom Ltd, C-252/07, 62007CJ0252 (Nov. 27, 2008 EUCJ), ¶ 71.
180. Intel Corporation Inc. v CPM United Kingdom Ltd, C-252/07,
62007CJ0252 (Nov. 27, 2008 EUCJ), ¶ 71, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62007CJ0252.
181. See Sylianos Malliaris, Protecting Famous Trademarks: Comparative
Analysis of US and EU Diverging Approaches—The Battle Between Legislatures and
the Judiciary, Who is the Ultimate Judge?, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 57
(2010).
182. PETER K. YU, THE SECOND TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, IN CONSTITUTIONAL HEDGES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Jonathan Griffiths & Tuomas Mylly, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2020).
183. Jens Schovsbo, “Mark My Words”-Trademarks and Fundamental Rights
in the EU, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 555, 564 (2018).
184. Martin Senftleben, Free Signs and Free Use—How to Offer Room for
Freedom of Expression Within the Trademark System, in CHRISTOPHER GEIGER,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 376
(Edward Elgar ed., 2015).
185. Regulation (EU) No 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and the
Council amending the Community trade mark regulation of Dec. 16, 2015, entered
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trademark applicants are now required to identify the goods and
services for which the application is made with sufficient clarity and
precision to delineate the extent of the protection.186 Absolute grounds
for refusal were extended to include signs consisting exclusively of a
“shape, or another characteristic” that results from the nature of the
goods themselves, is necessary to obtain a technical result, or gives
substantial value to the goods.187 This provision prevents protection of
features or characteristics that are inherent in a product or are entirely
functional.188
Significantly, the 2016 reforms added a recital that requires
trademark rules to be “applied in a way that ensures full respect for
fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of
expression.”189 Among other things, this new interpretation prevents
EUTM owners from interfering with:
“the use of signs or indications by third parties which are used fairly
and thus in accordance with honest practices in industrial and
commercial matters.”
“the use of descriptive or non-distinctive signs or indications in
general.”
“the fair and honest use of the EU trademark for the purpose of
identifying or referring to the goods or services as those of the
proprietor.”
“[u]se of a trademark by third parties to draw the consumer’s
attention to the resale of genuine goods that were originally sold by
or with the consent of the proprietor of the EU trademark in the
into
force
on
Mar.
23,
2016,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:32015R2424.
186. EUTMR Art. 33(2).
187. EUTMR Art. 9(e).
188. See, e.g., Société de Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK Ltd., Case C215/14, EU:C:2015:604 (CJEU 2015), ¶ 42 (to be sufficiently distinctive for
trademark registration, a shape must be more than recognizable but must indicate the
origin of the goods); Societe des Produits Nestle SA v Cadbury UK Ltd, [2016]
E.W.H.C. 50 (Ch); [2016] F.S.R. 19, ¶ 61 (applying CEJU guidance to refuse
registration of Kit Kat chocolate bar’s four-finger wafer shape), aff’d Societe des
Produits Nestle SA v Cadbury UK Ltd, [2017] E.W.C.A. Civ. 358; [2017] F.S.R. 34.
189. EUTMR Recital 21.
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Union should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the same
time in accordance with honest practices in industrial and
commercial matters.”
“[u]se of a trademark by third parties for the purpose of artistic
expression should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the
same time in accordance with honest practices in industrial and
commercial matters.”190

Thus, EU law on its face now strikes a better balance between
trademark exclusivity and freedom of competition and expression.191
B. United Kingdom Trademark Traditionalism
In the UK, the Trade Marks Act 1994 is the establishing legislation,
and is currently framed to harmonize with the EUTMR.192 After
December 31, 2021, under the Brexit withdrawal agreement, the UK no
longer protects EU trademarks.193 To manage this transition, the UK
enacted legislation to create a comparable UK trademark for all right

190. EUTMR Recital 21. Recital 21 is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement
and Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) that
limit the scope of trademark rights to protect freedom of expression. See Lisa P.
Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE
J. INT’L L. 405, 409 (2010).
191. See Schovsbo, supra note 183, at 562, 581 (observing that the recital
“clearly exempts artistic use of trademarks from legal challenge” but “is not going to
revolutionize EU trademark”); see also Annual Review of EU Trademark Law, VI.
Trademark Infringement, 110 TRADEMARK REP. 575, 588-89, (2020) (describing
Austrian Supreme Court decision acknowledging the right of a sports marketing
agency to use a trademark to identify a soccer team as long as it did not do so to
advertise its own services).
192. Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 § 99 (Eng.) as amended 14:32, ¶ 1, Trade
Marks
(Amendment
etc.)
(EU
Exit)
Regulations
2019/269,
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1994/ukpga_19940026_en_7#pt4-pb1-l1g99; see
also Trade Mark Rules 2008 (as amended).
193. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, PARLIAMENT,
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/201920/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html; see also UK Intellectual Property
Office, Guidance on EU trade mark protection and comparable UK trade marks (Jan.
30, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-trade-mark-protection-and-comparableuk-trade-marks#receiving-a-comparable-uk-trade-mark.
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holders with an existing EUTM as of that date.194 The Brexit
withdrawal agreement also provided that EU law will operate as UK
domestic law after it leaves the EU.195 So in the short term, Brexit has
had little impact on trademark rights in the UK and throughout the EU.
In the medium to longer term, Brexit has opened the door for the
UK to revert to an earlier, more traditional approach to trademark on
both the legislative and judicial fronts. First, the Brexit withdrawal
agreement granted the UK Parliament the authority to modify adopted
EU laws as it sees fit.196 While Parliament has not done so as of this
writing, one example of how UK intellectual property law already
differs from EU law is the UK Intellectual Property (Unjustified
Threats) Act 2017.197 That statute strengthened existing law that
prohibited groundless threats of infringement proceedings by holders of
intellectual property (IP) rights, including trademark. It protects
businesses and entrepreneurs from bullying or aggressive tactics to gain
an unfair advantage in situations where no IP infringement has actually
occurred, and to provide a framework for resolving IP disputes without
litigation.198 Translated to the trademark merchandising context, the
Act raises the stakes for a sports trademark owner in sending cease-anddesist letters to an unaffiliated user of the mark.

194. Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, Schedule 2A (Eng.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/269/schedule/1/made. Existing EUTMs
still protect trademarks in EU member states, and UK businesses can still apply to the
EU Intellectual Property Office for an EUTM. For new filings, registrants must apply
to both jurisdictions. See UK Intellectual Property Office, Guidance EU trademark
protection
and
comparable
UK
trade
marks
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-trade-mark-protection-and-comparable-uk-trademarks#receiving-a-comparable-uk-trade-mark.
195. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, PARLIAMENT,
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/201920/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html; see Emma Coffey, Cutting Off the EU
to Spite Its Face?: How to Promulgate the UK’s Contractual Choice of Law Rules to
Ensure Stability Post-Brexit, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1447, 1448-49 (2020).
196. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, PARLIAMENT,
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/201920/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html.
197. Intellectual Property (Unjustified Threats) Act 2017, Trade Mark Acts
1994 § 21 et seq.; see Policy Paper-IP (Unjustified Threats) Act, gov.uk (July 3, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ip-unjustified-threats-act.
198. See id.
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Second, after Brexit, UK courts have the power to diverge in their
interpretation of trademark law.199 Although much CJEU jurisprudence
is likely to remain persuasive, UK courts have at times struggled to
reconcile CJEU guidance with the relevant legislation, and resisted
extending trademark protection where that tribunal would grant it.200
The UK national system may well chart a different course on some
issues once it is no longer subject to evolving EU standards and future
CJEU decisions.201 Relatedly, the question remains whether past CJEU
decisions, even if adopted into UK law, will act as binding precedent or
will apply only to the rights of the parties adjudicated in those cases.202
The potential for jurisprudential divergence will have significance
beyond the UK, as international business parties have long favored
litigating in English commercial courts for their quality and integrity.203

199. See Ron Moscona, Extricating the UK from the European Union IP
Systems—Contrasting Approaches Across the Channel, 26 No. 3 CYBERSPACE LAW.
NL 4 (Apr. 2021); Maimon Schwarzschild, Complicated-but Not Too Complicated:
The Sunset of E.U. Law in the U.K. After Brexit, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 914 (2018).
200. See Gowling WLG, What does Brexit mean for intellectual property?,
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2020/whatdoes-brexit-mean-for-intellectual-property/ (citing as examples Societe des Produits
Nestle SA v Cadbury UK Ltd, [2016] E.W.H.C. 50 (Ch); [2016] F.S.R. 19, ¶ 61
((rejecting registration of the shape of Nestle’s Kit Kat bar as lacking inherent
distinctiveness)); Supreme Petfoods v. Henry Bell & Co [2015] EWHC 256 (Ch)
(holding the word “supreme” was descriptive when used in relation to animal food);
Sky v Skykick [2018] EWHC 155 (Ch) (holding trademark registration contrary to
public interest “because it confers on the proprietor a monopoly of immense breadth
which cannot be justified by any legitimate commercial interest of the proprietor”);
see also Annual Review of EU Trademark Law, IV. Absolute Grounds for Refusal of
Registration, and for Cancellation, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 444, 472 (2018).
201. The likelihood of a return to trademark traditionalism is also suggested by
the UK refusal to establish a specific right of publicity. See generally Hayley Stallard,
The Right of Publicity in the United Kingdom, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 565 (1998).
202. Schwarzschild, supra note 199, at 914.
203. Jan Erik Windthorst, James Freeman, Karolina Latasz, Holger Jacobs, The
Impact of Brexit on Dispute Resolution: EU and UK Perspectives, 15 DISP. RESOL.
INT’L 249, 260 (2021). Annette Kur has observed that differences between European
and Anglo-American approaches to intellectual property law largely reflect their
different theoretical foundations. Continental Europe historically based IP rights on
an idealistic theory that emphasizes the moral rights of the creator to the intellectual
creation. Anglo-American law rests on a more utilitarian rationale that focuses on how
IP protection affects society, including with respect to innovation, competition, and
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The recency of both the EU and UK legislative developments make
it difficult to predict their impact in restraining the commodification of
trademark. But existing jurisprudence, especially regarding the law’s
“trademark use” and “distinctiveness” requirements, offers some
opportunity to trend-spot, most significantly the Arsenal case.204 Like
the sequential court decisions in Boston Professional Hockey, the
Arsenal case generated opposing perspectives on the phenomenon of
trademark merchandising.205 In 1999, Arsenal FC, the English Premier
League soccer club, initiated passing off and trademark infringement
claims against Reed, who had been selling merchandise incorporating
club marks in and around the team stadium for 30 years.206 The England
and Wales High Court (EWHC) Chancery Division dismissed the
passing off claim for lack of consumer confusion, but referred the claim
of trademark infringement to the European court.207
Notably, the EWHC’s rejection of the passing off claim was based
on lack of evidence of deception or that Arsenal was damaged by
Reed’s activities. The court took great stock in the fact that Reed’s stalls
all displayed disclaimers that the products were not officially
licensed.208 Accordingly, it found that the use of team marks on Reed’s
merchandise “carries no message of trade origin.”209 The court
implicitly rejected the “recognition equals confusion” logic of Boston
Professional Hockey in stating:
Although I accept that some fans will want to purchase official
Arsenal memorabilia so as to support their club, it is a non-sequitur
to say that this means all Arsenal memorabilia…. will be taken by
them to have come from or be licensed by [Arsenal].210

consumer satisfaction. ANNETTE KUR, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7
(Elgar Publishing 2nd Ed. 2019).
204. Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, 2001 R.P.C. 46, [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 23,
[2001] E.T.M.R. 77, 2001 WL 272936 (Ch. D. 2001) [Arsenal 1].
205. See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
206. Arsenal 1, ¶ 9. This article uses the term “soccer” to refer to the sport that
most of the world refers to as “football,” to avoid confusion with American football.
207. Arsenal 1, ¶ 69.
208. Arsenal 1, ¶ 40.
209. Arsenal 1, ¶ 42.
210. Arsenal 1, ¶ 42.
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To establish passing off, the court required some additional
circumstance that implied to the customer that Reed’s goods came from
the club itself.211
As to the infringement claim, the EWHC was receptive to Reed’s
argument that placing Arsenal marks on merchandise as a “badge of
allegiance” is not a protectable “trademark use” because it does not
indicate origin.212 Echoing the lower court in Boston Professional
Hockey, the court observed that if registration of a sign creates a right
to restrain its use for any non-trademark purpose, the UK’s Trade Mark
Act and the EU’s Trade Mark Directive “will have created a new and
very wide monopoly … of open-ended duration .. [with] repercussion
beyond the mere private rights of competing traders.”213 In particular,
the court was concerned that such a “wide construction” of the law
would undermine the requirement of trademark distinctiveness and
create inconsistencies in the UK law.214 Noting that other national
courts had faced similar issues arising out of trademark merchandising,
the UK court sought CJEU guidance as to whether a defense to
infringement existed for uses that do not indicate trade origin.215
The CJEU walked a fine line in its guidance, requiring some degree
of confusion to justify trademark protection, but orienting that inquiry
around whether a third party’s use had “affect[ed] one of the functions
of the mark,” and not whether the third party had engaged in a
“trademark use.”216 In doing so, the court focused on the expectations
of the trademark holder, rather than the evidentiary record of consumer
impact.217 Like the Fifth Circuit in Boston Professional Hockey, the
CJEU disregarded the lower court’s factual findings and presumed that
consumers necessarily interpreted the presence of Arsenal marks on
Reed’s goods to establish a “material link in the course of trade between
the goods concerned and the trade mark proprietor.”218 Stated another
211. Arsenal 1, ¶ 42.
212. Arsenal 1, ¶ 53.
213. Arsenal 1, ¶ 54.
214. Arsenal 1, ¶ 59.
215. Arsenal 1, ¶ 63-69.
216. Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (C-206/01), [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 12, ¶ 42
[Arsenal CJEU].
217. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 51-60; see Maniatis, supra note 160, at 133.
218. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 56.
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way, the court found that team logos necessarily communicate that the
goods “have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a
single undertaking which is responsible for their quality”—namely, the
team.219
The CJEU was careful to exclude from infringement liability
“purely descriptive” uses of a mark.220 However, it rejected Reed’s
argument that his use fell within that category, as he was participating
in “commercial activity with a view to economic advantage.”221 Nor, in
the court’s view, could Reed’s activity be saved from liability through
point-of-sale disclaimers of affiliation with Arsenal, because such
disclaimers would not mitigate post-sale confusion.222 Further straying
from the UK court’s factual record, the CJEU held it to be “immaterial
that … the sign is perceived as a badge of support for or loyalty or
affiliation to the trade mark proprietor.”223 With this guidance, the
CJEU came close to adopting the circular reasoning that leads
consumers to expect any display of sports affiliation to originate from
the team.224
When the matter returned to the UK courts, Arsenal eventually won
the day, but not without some controversy. Appalled that the CJEU
seemed to have “exceeded its jurisdiction” in ignoring the evidentiary
record, the EWHC in turn ignored what it deemed improper CJEU
factfinding.225 While purporting to apply the CJEU’s legal guidance,
the EWCH rejected infringement liability based on record evidence that
the Arsenal indicia on Reed’s products would be perceived as badges
of allegiance and not an indication of origin.226 That ruling, however,
was reversed by the English Court of Appeal, which latched onto the
CJEU’s post-sale confusion rationale to hold that, even if primarily a
badge of allegiance, Reed’s use of Arsenal marks jeopardized their
219. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 58.
220. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 54.
221. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 40.
222. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ 58 (generally read as establishing post-sale confusion in
the European Union).
223. Arsenal CJEU, ¶ R1.
224. See Maniatis, supra note 160, at 134; see also supra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text.
225. Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (No.2), [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 13, 2002 WL
31676299, ¶ 7 [Arsenal 2].
226. Arsenal 2, ¶¶ 10, 20.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss2/4

42

Balsam: Timeout for Sports Trademark Overprotection: Comparing the United

2022]

SPORTS TRADEMARK OVERPROTECTION

393

guarantee of origin.227 The English Court of Appeal further categorized
Reed’s use as a “trademark use” because purchasers of his goods were
likely to turn to Arsenal to complain about inferior quality.228
Despite both the CJEU’s and the English Court of Appeal’s
protection of trademark merchandising in Arsenal, the doctrine has not
established as firm a hold as in the US, and some decisions have pushed
back. One notable example is Rugby Football Union v. Cotton Traders,
Ltd., where an apparel manufacturer successfully defended an
infringement claim for selling unlicensed classic rugby jerseys bearing
a design similar to the Rugby Football Union’s (RFU) rugby rose.229
Although the RFU had terminated the manufacturer as an official
licensee, the manufacturer continued to produce jerseys using a
different design of the rose feature.230 The EWHC allowed it do so,
holding that the English rugby rose is incapable of being distinctive or
serving a trademark use because so many manufacturers and retailers
use a version of it and the public primarily perceives it as an emblem of
allegiance to the national team, not an indicia of association with the
RFU.231 In the alternative, the court ruled that even if the rose was a
protectible mark, the manufacturer could defend against infringement
claims on the basis of “honest use” of the mark to communicate the
kind, quality, or other characteristics of the goods, that is, as a badge of
allegiance.232 While this ruling will likely have little impact beyond
historic or national symbols, it reflects UK court resistance to expansive
readings of trademark. It could also give pause to any sports team that
incorporates an historic landmark into its logo, for example, the
Cleveland Guardians use of the eponymous statues that famously
occupy the ends of a bridge leading to its stadium.233
A 2020 case involving expressive use of a sports team mark offers
further evidence of UK adherence to traditional trademark norms. In
227. Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed, [2003] EWCA Civ 96; [2003] 2
C.M.L.R. 25, 2003 WL 21047477, ¶ 48 [hereinafter Arsenal CA].
228. Arsenal CA, ¶¶ 55, 67.
229. Rugby Football Union v. Cotton Traders Ltd, 2002 E.W.H.C. 467, 2002
E.T.M.R. 76 (Ch. D. 2002) [hereinafter Rugby Football Union].
230. Rugby Football Union, ¶ 2.
231. Rugby Football Union, ¶ 50-52 (distinguishing Arsenal in part because
there the team used the marks on merchandise labels, not just as design elements).
232. Rugby Football Union, ¶ 55.
233. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Manchester United Football Club Ltd. v. Sega Publishing Europe Ltd.
& Anor, the celebrated soccer club sued to stop Sega’s video game from
using the Manchester United name and a simplified version of the team
crest.234 While the case was pending, the club sought to amend the claim
to allege accessory liability because the Sega game allowed gamers to
download third-party video files known as “patches” that included
exact replicas of team marks.235 The EWHC rejected this request,
finding that the new claim would fail because downloading patches is a
private, expressive, and non-trademark use.236 The case later settled
and, although the agreement was confidential, the parties’
announcement at the time suggested Sega did not pay any damages or
need a license to use the Manchester United name going forward.237 If
US courts applied this rationale, it could undo sports league and
university trademark enforcement campaigns against youth and
amateur leagues that borrow team names.238
Thus, like in the US, the EU and UK recognize that trademarks can
function as a commodity to communicate identity and affiliation.239
They differ, however, in the extent to which the law should endow the
trademark owner with exclusive rights to exploit that function, while
promoting efficient competition and free expression.
III. TIMEOUT TO RECONSIDER SPORTS TRADEMARK OVERPROTECTION
Given how invested sports industry mark owners are in the current
trademark regime, there seems to be little incentive for them to
234. Manchester United Football Club Ltd. v. Sega Publishing Europe Ltd. &
Anor [2020] EWHC 1439 (Ch) (June 4, 2020), 111 TMR 641.
235. Id. ¶ 10.
236. Id. ¶ 30-33.
237. Jeremy Drew, et al., Sega’s Battle Against Man Utd In Football Manager
Trade Mark Case Ends In Settlement, LAWINSPORT (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/sega-s-battle-against-man-utd-in-footballmanager-trade-mark-case-ends-in-settlement; compare Major League Baseball
Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 212, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 542
F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008) (MLB allowed to pursue claim that team uniform colors have
achieved secondary meaning prohibiting their unlicensed use).
238. See supra notes 99-101, 106-07, and accompanying text; David E.
Armendariz, Picking on the Little Guy? Asserting Trademark Rights Against Fans,
Emulators, and Enthusiasts, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2012).
239. See KUR, supra note 203, at 245.
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welcome a second look at commodification of their names and logos.240
However, this may be unavoidable in view of the five cross-border
developments this article has already touched upon: (1) the growing
unavailability of suitable team names is complicating sports branding
and rebranding; (2) athletes are increasingly and defensively seeking to
extend their intellectual property portfolios to trademark, further
cluttering that space; (3) Brexit has released the UK from the EU
trademark regulatory regime and jurisprudence that historically have
been more protective than UK law; (4) free speech values have gained
purchase in opposition to overprotective trademark doctrine, as
evidenced in US Supreme Court decisions and EU trademark reforms;
and (5) the US Trademark Modernization Act and its enabling
regulations have the potential to declutter the federal registry and
reemphasize trademark use requirements.
A. Societal Values at Stake
Before exploring the potential impact of those developments, it is
important to make clear what is at stake in trademark overprotection, in
particular sports trademarks. Beyond debasement of traditional
trademark principles, overprotection of trademark implicates at least
four societal values: (1) consumer welfare, (2) competitive and efficient
markets, (3) freedom of speech, and (4) the very meaning of words and
symbols. First, the expansion of trademark to include absolute
merchandising rights and dilution protection has transferred revenue to
teams and licensees to the detriment of fans, advancing corporate
welfare over trademark’s original orientation around consumer
welfare.241 If unaffiliated and properly labeled merchandise were
available in addition to officially licensed goods, fans would enjoy a

240. Frequently cited justifications for aggressive trademark enforcement
include concerns about abandonment, the desire to preserve future market
opportunities, and deterrent effects of establishing a reputation for trademark
vigilance/bullying. See Boyle & Jenkins, supra note 125, at 448, 451.
241. See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1197
(blaming in part the lack of consumer standing and participation in trademark
litigation for its “evolution from efficient market regulator to inefficient rent
protector”).
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competitive market offering options at multiple price-points, and less
affluent fans would find it easier to support their teams.242
Second, some trademark scholars have come to recognize that the
expansion of trademark has limited the available supply of words and
symbols to designate new goods and services.243 An empirical study
conducted in 2016 found that “the supply of word marks that are at least
reasonably competitively effective as trademarks is finite and
exhaustible.”244 As a result new applicants must resort to suboptimal
marks that are lengthier, unfamiliar, hard-to-pronounce, or discordant,
raising barriers to entry and reducing the communicative value of
trademarks.245 This “trademark depletion” gradually damages
competition, increases consumer search costs, and compounds the free
speech concerns addressed next.246
Third, the trademark merchandising right is in tension with the First
Amendment’s free speech guarantee. As the Supreme Court recognized
in its Tam and Brunetti decisions, trademarks are a form of speech
entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection.247 This form of
speech has become essential to public discourse precisely because
trademark owners have invested their brands with secondary meaning

242. This point has been made in multiple commentaries on the phenomenon of
sports trademark merchandising, including Liu, supra note 30, at 508; Hylton, supra
note 21, at 49; Kahn, supra note 52, at 308-309.
243. See Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 25, at 1026 (collecting
commentary); Zachary Zagger, Wash. Team Rules Out “Wolves” Name, Cites TM
Legal Hurdles, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.law360.com/sports-andbetting/articles/1452323/wash-team-rules-out-wolves-name-cites-tm-legalhurdles?nl_pk=70cbb14d-495d-4b25-863cda2953f1df29&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=sport
s-and-betting (ruling out candidate for renaming Washington Football Team because
teams in other leagues use version of name).
244. Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks?
An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945,
950-51 (2018) (empirical study establishing “substantial word-mark depletion”).
245. Id. at 965-66.
246. Id. at 1023-25.
247. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
1744, 1760 (2017); see generally Ramsey, supra note 45, at 456 (arguing for
examination of dilution laws as speech-suppressing).
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and proliferated them across a wide range of ancillary products.248
Consequently, overprotection of trademark comes at the expense of
public access to language and iconography.249 Trademark fair use
doctrine works to restore the balance by permitting certain expressive
references to a trademark owner and its products.250 And some have
argued for broader application of the nominative fair use defense in the
context of sports, because team names and trade dress have uniquely
“communicative and associative functions.”251 However, a fair use
approach undervalues the constitutional dimension of the problem, as
evidenced in the sports catchphrase apparel cases where trademark
owners have succeeded in blocking commentary on sports team
performance.252
Fourth, the merchandising right has usurped and calcified the
meaning of words and symbols. Historically, the meanings of words
and symbols change over time as a result of individual and cultural
interactions.253 With the commodification of trademarks, their owners
have become vested in “freezing” and “fencing off” the meaning of
protected words and symbols, especially as indicators of status and
identity.254 Nowhere is this more evident than in sports, where fans
classify themselves and create identity through team symbols,
“personalizing the part of the game over which they have control,
248. See McGeveran, supra note 25, at 57 (“Their cultural importance makes
trademarks increasingly necessary in any realistic portrayal of modern society.”);
Kozinski, supra note 21, at 973 (giving as an example, “the Rolls Royce of its class”).
249. Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1, 1 (1999).
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (setting forth fair use defense to trademark
dilution).
251. See Liu, supra note 30, at 513.
252. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text; see also Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: Protecting
Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 916
(2005) (noting that parody, which invites trademark claims, may find the fair use
defense inadequate: “The parodist-defendant purposely concedes many of the
elements necessary to prove infringement and dilution, including the strength of
trademark, similarity of the marks, and intentional reproduction of the mark.”).
253. Aoki, supra note 30, at 526.
254. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:
Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1866
(1991).
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themselves.”255 But with respect to phrases like the “12th Man” or
symbols like the Dallas Cowboys blue and silver star, personalization
has hit a dead end, as trademark law has empowered owners to stifle
any attempts to repurpose and recodify. Investing one entity with
exclusive ownership of a phrase or symbol risks stunting the public
vocabulary and suppressing ideas.256
To return to the case of the Cleveland Guardians, we see all four
concerns play out. The baseball team will certainly rely on the
trademark merchandising right to thwart any unauthorized manufacture
of items displaying the team’s new name and logos, arguing that such a
use would create consumer confusion as to “origin,” “affiliation,”
“sponsorship,” or “approval.” A hypothetical shirt seller offering
consumers a lower-priced option for displaying team affinity would
invariably find itself in the crosshairs of an infringement suit. The team
would assert that most consumers are so naïve or preconditioned that
they will invariably read the shirt’s message and imagery to mean that
the underlying product was authorized by the league or team, as
opposed to merely an ornamental expression. Even if the unauthorized
seller simply displays the name “Cleveland Guardians” in ordinary
script and an image of the Cleveland Hope Memorial Bridge statues
that inspired the team logo, it will risk dilution and sponsorship
confusion claims.257 Sports fans will find a less-competitive market
offering fewer options and higher-prices.
Notably, the baseball team’s trademark settlement with the
Cleveland Guardians roller derby team permits both parties to continue
to use the “Guardians” name and similar logos based on the iconic
statues.258 If a baseball fan mistakenly purchases a roller derby team
jersey, both teams would undoubtedly protest to any consumer
255. Aoki, supra note 30, at 530; see also Liu, supra note 30, at 507.
256. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir.
1987) (reversing injunction against noncommercial parody of mark that owner found
offensive); see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. US Olympic Comm., 483
US 522, 569 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that the word “Olympic” has
“a life and force” of its own with no “adequate translation”).
257. See Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Md. 1992)
(enjoining vendor from using “Camden Yards” name on apparel in infringement
action by owner of Baltimore Orioles’ new stadium named for the historic “Camden
Yards” district).
258. See Zagger, supra note 3.
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protection agency that their marks are sufficiently distinct and nondeceptive.259 The teams would likely claim that the additional branding
elements—different color schemes and depictions of the statues—
minimize potential consumer confusion. In other words, the parties’
settlement agreement implicitly acknowledges that consumers are
sufficiently sophisticated to differentiate among two sports teams
sharing the same name, hometown, and iconography.260 Sports teams
are thus having it both ways—disavowing consumer confusion when
they profit from sharing their marks, while asserting that any other use
of their marks invariably deceives or harms.261
Competitive markets will face further impairment as the baseball
team will likely stake out its claim to the name beyond the business of
baseball, or even the business of sports. Expect the league and team to
challenge any future attempt to register the word “guardians” or related
symbols as trademarks in any geographic or product market. At a
minimum, they will likely seek to extract rents from a new product,
service, or sports team that seeks to use the mark, even if the use raises
no prospect of consumer confusion.
The free use and evolution of language is also at risk in this
scenario. Any merchandise that expresses support of—or griping
about—the Cleveland baseball team will face opposition from the
trademark owner, who will scrutinize the message for whether it
communicates team sponsorship or approval, or potentially dilutes the
mark. The slim chances of a fair use defense will likely chill the speech
altogether.262 A byproduct of this exclusive use will be the stifling of
any ongoing cultural critique and appropriation of the words and

259. See, e.g., Complaint in Suero v. NFL et al., 1:22-cv-00031 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
4, 2022) (alleging false advertising and deceptive practices by NFL and the Giants
and Jets teams for using New York in the names of teams that play in New Jersey).
260. See Zagger, supra note 3.
261. See Harlem Wizards Ent. Basketball, Inc. v. NBA Properties, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1084, 1095 (D.N.J. 1997) (endorsing NBA’s argument that rebranded
Washington “Wizards” team did not create confusion with senior user of same name
for “show basketball” team); Keegan Girodo, Lookalike Logos: Is A High School’s
Use of A Logo or Insignia Similar to That of A University A Violation Under the
Lanham Act, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 463, 482 (2018) (describing how college
athletic programs no longer demand same-name high school teams cease and desist,
but instead bully them into licensing the college trademarks).
262. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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symbols embedded in the team’s marks, empowering the owner to fix
and control their meaning.
B. Costs to Sports TM Owners
Why should any sports trademark owner—leagues, teams,
athletes—care about the harms identified above? Because they are not
without cost to those owners. Beyond the normal costs of
enforcement,263 trademark bullying can deplete the very goodwill the
brand is trying to build, especially when action is taken against fans,
out-of-market uses, and recreational, amateur, and other lower level
sports leagues and teams.264 When a sports trademark bully demands
that a college, high school, or youth league forfeit its name, logo, or
mascot, it alienates that community by forcing them to spend time and
money to rebrand themselves and rebuild an identity.265
Overenforcement also forfeits any potential benefit the use could have
generated, such as multiplying opportunities for consumer awareness,
intensifying existing fan engagement, promoting purchases of official
merchandise, and even inspiring participation in the sport.266 As noted
elsewhere, merchandise displaying team names and symbols, even if
unlicensed, “serves as free advertising, reminding people to go see or
tune into a ballgame.”267
In addition, and somewhat ironically, sports mark owners’
contributions to trademark commodification and overenforcement have
started to come back to haunt them in the form of mounting
impediments to the introduction of new marks and logos, and use of the
263. See Boyle & Jenkins, supra note 125, at 447 (2020) (citing estimates that
a single trademark opposition proceeding can cost between $90,000 to $500,000).
264. Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-ofPublicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (2016) (observing that overenforcement
of trademark deters socially valuable behaviors that impose little or no harm on the
trademark owner); Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 625, 676 (2011) (arguing for small businesses and individuals to shame
trademark bullies and deter future overenforcement).
265. See Armendariz, supra note 238, at 1277-78 (describing fan backlash
against MLB’s Philadelphia Phillies when it demanded that contestants in a
homemade flying machine contest remove a replica of the team mascot, the Phillie
Phanatic, from their machine).
266. See Armendariz, supra note 238, at 1276-77.
267. Kozinski, supra note 21, at 967–68.
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vernacular to promote their own sports. For example, when the NHL
expanded to Las Vegas in 2016 and tried to register the “Golden
Knights” name, its new team faced obstacles arising from the very
consumer expectations of affiliation that sports leagues have spent
decades of litigation to establish.268 First, the USPTO rejected the
team’s application on the grounds that it is similar to the Golden
Knights name and logo of the College of Saint Rose, a small school in
Albany, New York that competes in NCAA Division II. The trademark
examiner found a likelihood of consumer confusion because
professional and college sports both “offer sports entertainment of a
kind available in the same venues, broadcast on television, and are
generally available to the same class of consumers.”269
The NHL fought back, arguing that professional teams routinely
share the same nickname as college athletics programs, such as the
Boston Bruins and UCLA Bruins, and that multiple “Knights” sports
teams are already registered. Although the USPTO ultimately permitted
the registration, it was limited to hockey exhibitions and not use on
apparel and other merchandise because the modifier “Golden” appeared
in only one other “Knights” registration—Saint Rose’s—and the
college also used that mark for merchandise.270 Little consideration
seems to have been given as to whether any consumer realistically
would confuse the hockey team’s merchandise with that of a college
with enrollment under 4,000 students.
The NHL Golden Knights also faced opposition from the US Army,
which alleged that the hockey team’s name and logo are “confusingly
similar in sound, meaning and appearance” to the Army’s parachute
team also known as the Golden Knights.”271 The opposition further
268. See Lunney, supra note 21, at 396-97 (observing that legal prohibition of
unlicensed uses of a mark will shape consumer expectations of sponsorship);
Denicola, supra note 134, at 1668 (describing how sports trademark owners’ legal
victories have fed consumer assumptions about whether the owners have the legal
right to control all use).
269. In re Las Vegas Golden Knights, No. 87147269 (U.S.P.T.O. Dec. 16,
2016).
270. See Zachary Zagger, Vegas Golden Knights Score Hockey TMs, LAW360
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/951877/vegas-golden-knightsscore-hockey-tms (reporting that the team also had to contend with trademark
“squatters” on variations of the name, including Black Knights).
271. GOLDEN KNIGHTS, Opp’n No. 91238886 (filed Jan. 10, 2018). The
Army’s sports teams are known as the Black Knights. See also UTAH ROYALS FC,
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alleged that the hockey team’s use of the name would dilute the Army’s
marks and damage the Army by falsely creating an association between
the two entities.272 Not surprisingly the NHL disagreed that confusion
is likely between a parachute team and a major league hockey team.
Ultimately, though, it agreed to enter into a co-existence agreement that
allowed the hockey team to register its marks while preserving the name
for the army’s parachute team.273 As of 2022, the Golden Knights
hockey team continued to rely on common law trademark rights and
state registrations, rather than federal registration, to proceed with use
of its name on apparel and merchandise.
Sports team rebrandings have encountered similar hurdles. The
Cleveland Guardians roller derby team was able to lodge a credible
infringement claim against the MLB team that its use of the same name
would invariably confuse consumers and overwhelm the roller derby
team’s rightful first use.274 Although quickly settled, that lawsuit’s
allegations exposed the obstacles the baseball team faced in trying to
adopt a new team name rooted in local history and concordant with its
stadium geography and team ethos.275 The roller derby team’s
complaint recites how, in April 2021, the baseball team filed an
application for the “Guardians” name outside the United States, in
Mauritius where any prior user would find it difficult to search the
database of pending trademark applications.276 By contrast, US
trademark applications are maintained in a database that is searchable
almost immediately. The baseball team filed a US trademark
Opp’n No. 91243302, ¶ 21 (filed Aug. 29, 2018) (MLB Kansas City Royals opposed
National Women’s Soccer League adoption of same name for Utah team, claiming it
would dupe consumers into believing the teams are affiliated).
272. Id.
273. Emily Caron, Golden Knights, U.S. Army End Trademark Dispute, Enter
ILLUSTRATED
(July
19,
2018),
Coexistence
Agreement,
SPORTS
https://www.si.com/nhl/2018/07/19/golden-knights-us-army-trademark-disputesettled-agreement-reached.
274. Complaint, ¶ 44 in Guardians Roller Derby v. Cleveland Guardians
Baseball Company LLC, 1:21-cv-02035 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2021) [hereafter
Guardians Complaint].
275. Michael Shapiro, Here’s Why Cleveland Chose “Guardians” for New
ILLUSTRATED
(July
23,
2021),
Team
Name,
SPORTS
https://www.si.com/mlb/2021/07/23/cleveland-guardians-name-change-decisionexplained.
276. Guardians Complaint, ¶ 22.
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application only when it was ready to announce its new name in July
2021, claiming priority back to the Mauritius filing date.277
The roller derby team’s complaint attributes this secrecy to the
baseball team’s scheme to bolster its negotiating position in settling any
infringement suit.278 More likely, the baseball team was trying to
minimize the risk that trademark squatters would file applications for
the “Cleveland Guardians” name to extort the team. Keep in mind that
any such squatter would necessarily be attaching the name to a
dissimilar product or service, since no other major league baseball team
plays in Cleveland. In a traditional trademark regime, such third-party
applications would have far less nuisance value since it would be
unlikely that consumers would confuse the baseball team and a squatter
using the name in an unrelated industry. Historically, significant
duplication and overlap has existed among sports teams, even in similar
markets, reducing registration and branding costs.279 But under current
trademark jurisprudence, the baseball team had to invest in stealth and,
ultimately, in a settlement with the same-named roller derby team,
despite the difference in the sports and their fan bases. Although the
settlement agreement is confidential, both parties will continue to use
the Guardians name, imposing additional costs on the baseball team to
ensure it differentiates its colors and logos to counter consumer
expectations of affiliation.280
Likewise the Washington Football Team struggled in its rebranding
efforts after retiring its former “Redskins” name in July 2020.281
Pending the selection of a new name, it sought to register “Washington
Football Team,” and was denied because of its generic geographic
nature and a pending application for that name by a noted trademark
squatter.282 A favored name—the “RedWolves”—was ruled out
277. Guardians Complaint, ¶ 29.
278. Guardians Complaint, ¶ 30.
279. See Darryl C. Wilson, The Legal Ramifications of Saving Face: An
Integrated Analysis of Intellectual Property and Sport, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
227, 260 n. 175 (1997) (noting “literally thousands of teams that share names across
the country”); Curtis & Stempler, supra note 9, at 28-29 (noting that over 10 Division
I college teams named “Tigers” or “Wildcats”).
280. See Zagger, supra note 3.
281. See Zagger, supra note 8.
282. See Andrew Lind, Washington Football Team’s Application to Trademark
(June
21,
2021),
Name
Denied,
SPORTSLOGOS
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because of the “legal hurdles” and “the prospect of years of litigation”
imposed by that name’s use by Arkansas State University, among
others.283 Its ultimate choice—the Commanders284—is also the name of
the San Antonio, Texas team in the once-and-future Alliance of
American Football, a professional football league that folded in 2019
but reportedly may be making a comeback.285 As of this writing,
information was not available regarding any trademark dispute between
the two teams or how it was resolved, but the EUIPO approach would
likely have permitted the overlap.286
Trademark’s protection of sports catchphrases imposed costs on
Major League Baseball, which had to sue to protect its use of the term
“opening day” in the face of a clothing manufacturer’s claim to own
that term.287 Although MLB established its use was non-infringing, the
rationale for the decision offers little comfort for future access to
common sports parlance. The court did not reject the “opening day”
mark outright as too generic.288 Instead, it found that the manufacturer
could not show its use of the mark was sufficiently deliberate and
continuous, or that MLB’s use would result in consumer confusion.289
Categorizing the mark as descriptive, the court allowed that if it had

https://news.sportslogos.net/2021/06/21/washington-football-teams-application-totrademark-name-denied/football/.
283. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
284. John Kelm, Washington selects Commanders as new NFL team name after
two-season
process,
ESPN
(Feb.
2,
2022),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/33199548/washington-selects-commandersnew-team-name-two-season-search (reporting Native American pressure on the
Kansas City Chiefs to similarly rebrand).
285. W. Scott Bailey, Commanders comeback a possibility for San Antonio,
ANTONIO
BUS.
J.
(Feb.
25,
2021),
SAN
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2021/02/25/commanders-comebacka-possibility-for-san-antonio.html.
286. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text describing overlapping
team name designations permitted by the EUIPO.
287. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Opening Day Prods., Inc., 385
F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
288. Opening Day Prods., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 272-73.
289. Opening Day Prods., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
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acquired secondary meaning, the Lanham Act would indeed offer it
protection.290
Major League Soccer (MLS) continues to face analogous obstacles
to its use of “Inter Miami” in connection with its South Florida team.
MLS registered trademarks for the team’s formal designation as Club
Internacional de Futbol Miami, as well as its nickname Inter Miami.291
It then opposed a trademark application for the term “inter” standing
alone, filed by Inter Milan, the Italian Serie A soccer club. MLS
protested that the term “inter” is descriptive and in widespread use in
soccer at all levels as a shorthand for “international.”292 Although there
was little risk that the MLS team would have to change its name, it was
concerned about future use of “inter” on team apparel and merchandise.
Uncertainty remains after the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) rejected MLS’s opposition in part and directed the parties to
litigate whether “inter” is descriptive and should not be registered, or
whether the term has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to endow Inter
Milan with exclusive rights.293 The ongoing fight over the use of the
word complicates the worldwide practice of incorporating common
descriptive terms like “inter,” “real,” and “united” into soccer team

290. Opening Day Prods., 285 F. Supp. 2d at 273; compare Bauer Bros., LLC
v. Nike, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1207 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (rejecting descriptive fair
use defense at summary judgment stage of infringement action against manufacturer
of “Don’t Tread on Me” shirts used to promote the US men’s national soccer team);
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.’s Team Properties, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d
622, 636 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (finding the Dallas Cowboys’ use of “America’s Team”
has acquired secondary meaning and justifies cancellation of shirt manufacturer’s
registration for the mark).
291. CLUB INTERNACIONAL DE FUTBOL MIAMI MMXX, Registration
No. 88129638 (filed Sept. 24, 2018 by Major League Soccer, L.L.C.); INTER MIAMI
CF, Registration No. 88410795 (filed May 1, 2019 by Major League Soccer L.L.C.).
292. MAJOR
LEAGUE
SOCCER,
L.L.C.,
Opposer,
v.
F.C.
INTERNAZIONALE MILANO S.P.A., Applicant., 2020 WL 889958 (Trademark Tr.
& App. Bd.).
293. MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, L.L.C., v. F.C. INTERNAZIONALE
MILANO S.p.A., 2020 WL 8340222 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd.); Inter Milan Wins
First Battle Against Inter Miami Over ‘Inter’ Trademark – Is Settlement Next?,
JDSUPRA (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/inter-milan-winsfirst-battle-against-3904275/ (reporting that the two teams were in settlement talks).
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names “to project credibility in the sport’s culture.”294 Obstacles to
sharing such cultural capital could stall soccer’s globalization and
hamper the business and growth of American teams.
Another industry stakeholder—the athlete—also bears the cost of
an overprotective trademark regime. The trademark merchandising
right currently prevents athletes from, for example, using their team’s
colors and logos descriptively when exploiting their own rights of
publicity.295 A more permissive descriptive fair use doctrine would
expand athlete opportunities and better communicate their identity to
their audience. Like teams and leagues, athletes are also harmed by the
vast increase in trademark applications, compelling them to register
their own name and catchphrases “defensively to prevent others from
capitalizing on their reputations.”296
Furthermore, any attempt by an athlete to incorporate popular
images or slogans for cross-cultural and promotional purposes risks a
challenge by trademark owners asserting their expressive monopoly.297
Thus, Australian tennis player Thanasi Kokkinakis found himself
facing a court battle with breakfast cereal maker Kellogg’s following
attempts to register the nickname “Special K,” which the sports media
had bestowed on Kokkinakis and his doubles partner Nick Kyrgios.298
Kokkinakis planned to use the nickname to market branded clothing
294. Leander Schaerlaeckens, Inter vs. Inter Is the Soccer Rivalry Trademark
TIMES
(Mar.
16,
2021),
Lawyers
Can
Love,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/sports/soccer/inter-milan-inter-miami.html.
295. See Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
2d 212, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008) (MLB allowed to
pursue claim that team uniform colors have achieved secondary meaning prohibiting
their unlicensed use); Nat’l Football League Props. v. Playoff Corp., 808 F. Supp.
1288, 1293 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (football card manufacturer who had licensed player
likenesses for trading cards could not rely on fair use defense to include team logos
as they appeared on player uniforms).
296. See Roberts, supra note 121, at 483 (describing the experience of athletes
and coaches who register trademarks for the control it affords).
297. See, e.g., Easter Unlimited, Inc. v. Rozier, No. 18-CV-06637 (KAM), 2021
WL 4409729, at *1-*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (owner of “Scream” horror film
mask claimed infringing use by NBA basketball player known for his on-court killer
instincts).
298. See, e.g., Emma Kemp, Kyrgios and Kokkinakis Revel in Another Wild
Showing of Special K Double Act, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/jan/25/kyrgios-and-kokkinakis-revel-inanother-wild-showing-of-special-k-double-act-australian-open.
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and tennis wear. Kellogg’s opposed his trademark application and in
turn sought to register their own “Special K” trademark in identical
classes to that of Kokkinakis—outside of the goods the company
typically produces.299 Although most spectators would consider
confusion as to source of origin unlikely, Kokkinakis backed down
rather than litigate the claim.
For trademark owners, the question thus is whether the monopoly
afforded by overprotection justifies its costs—loss of goodwill, missed
exposure opportunities, increased expense of registration and clearance,
litigation risk, reduced access to cultural capital, and commercial
linguistic scarcity that burdens market entry and expansion. Recent
developments in trademark, and the comparative approaches of the EU
and UK, offer an opportunity to identify new strategies and spheres of
compromise where looser conception and enforcement of trademark
rights will actually benefit the sports industry, and its fans and
consumers.
IV. BREAKING THE HUDDLE: A NEW SPORTS TRADEMARK STRATEGY
While trademark law is unlikely to revert to its early Lanham Act
days, a new strategy for sports trademarks would go far to restore a
more equitable balance at least in that industry, with possible spillover
effects in others. This strategy entails some compromises and initiatives
situated in approaches to trademark registration, litigation, and
legislation.
First, trademark registration reforms offer the opportunity to
recalibrate what could and should be afforded registry privileges. A
consortium of sports mark owners should invest in a program to take
advantage of the Trademark Modernization Act’s ex parte
expungement and reexamination procedures.300 Major league sports
trademark owners already cooperate on intellectual property matters.
MLB Properties, NBA Properties, NFL Properties, NHL Enterprises,
and IMG College Licensing collaborate to combat counterfeit
merchandise through an organization known as CAPS—Coalition to
299. Special K: Tennis Player in Legal Battle with Kellogg’s Over Nickname,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
8,
2017),
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jun/08/special-k-kokkinakis-legal-battlekelloggs.
300. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
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Advance the Protection of Sports Logos. CAPS has established a joint
trademark enforcement program—both civil and criminal—and a
website that promotes consumer awareness of how to identify
counterfeit jerseys and other merchandise.301 A separate, overlapping
group coordinates advocacy in front of the Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB) to pursue statutory royalty fees. The CRB “Joint Sports
Claimants” comprise MLB, NBA, NFL, NCAA, NHL, and the
Women’s National Basketball Association.302
Likewise, in connection with the TMA, sports entities could enter
a joint representation agreement, select intellectual property counsel,
and have them scour the registry for unused sports-related trademarks.
Ideally, this federal registry reform group would expand to include
players associations and governing bodies of individual sports.303 Broad
participation would keep the process honest and equitable, decluttering
the registry of unused or abandoned trademarks of consortium members
as well as squatters and other third parties. The rewards would inhere
to both the sports entities and the broader sports market, ultimately
making new trademarks more accessible and clearance and registration
more cost-efficient for all. As a role model for this type of effort, the
USPTO should avail itself of director-initiated proceedings to launch a
sweeping review of dormant trademarks across all industries.
In the spirit of the TMA’s intent, the USPTO should also establish
clearer guidelines for its examiners in evaluating registration
applications, with the goal of simplifying the process for legitimate
businesses to clear and register marks actually being used in commerce.
That would entail closer attention to the trademark use and
distinctiveness requirements for registration, rejecting purely functional

301. See Quick Tips for Identifying CAPS Members’ Counterfeit Product,
CAPS,
http://www.capsinfo.com/index.php/quick-product-id/40-quick-tips-foridentifying-counterfeit-product (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
302. See Adjustment of Cable Statutory License Royalty Rates, 81 FR 2465501, 24656 n.3 (Apr. 26, 2016) (identifying the members of the Joint Sports Claimants);
Indep. Producers Grp. v. Libr. of Cong., 792 F.3d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting
arguments of Joint Sports Claimants in seeking a share of cable royalty funds).
303. These might include Major League Soccer, the Professional Golfers
Association, the Association of Tennis Professional, and the Players Associations of
all these entities.
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attributes and stand-alone descriptive terms.304 The process should also
incorporate a stronger ex ante inquiry into the likelihood that a
consumer might confuse two separately owned trademarks, pursuant to
the Lanham Act provision that allows registration of similar marks
when the USPTO “determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is
not likely to result.”305
With respect to sports industry marks, that inquiry should take into
account the nature of the owners, the custom of the industry, and the
categories of products and services. Accordingly, historical naming
customs should permit legitimate applicants to register common team
names in different sports and/or markets. So a professional baseball
team could share a name with a local roller derby team or a little league
team, a state university could share a name with a local high school, and
any soccer team could incorporate “inter” into its name, without any of
the litigation threats, co-existence agreements, and extortionate
licensing deals currently in use.
Correspondingly, registration should be denied to names consisting
of descriptive sports terms or common catchphrases, especially in light
of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tam and Brunetti.306 Those rulings
sent a clear message to the USPTO that the registration process may not
be effectuated in a manner that offends the First Amendment.307
Accordingly, in evaluating a mark’s “distinctiveness” to determine
whether it has achieved secondary meaning, the examiners should take
into account the risk of chilling the use of descriptive, informational, or
popular terms and phrases.308 A 2021 decision of the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board suggests support for this view. In a precedential
decision, the TTAB upheld the opposition of the University of
Kentucky to deny a third party’s registration of “40-0,” a reference to a

304. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e); see Considerations Relevant to Determination of
Descriptiveness or Genericness in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure §
1209.03 et seq. (2021).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
306. See supra note 143-149 and accompanying text.
307. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747, 1751 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti,
139 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2019).
308. See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 466 (arguing that “[i]nherently valuable
expression registered as a mark should never become immune from cancellation”).
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perfect basketball season record in NCAA Division I competition.309
The TTAB found the term is merely an informational phrase that fails
to function as a trademark.310 More importantly, the TTAB
acknowledged that an applicant “cannot appropriate the term
exclusively to itself, denying the competing colleges, as well as their
fans, the right to use it freely.”311
EUIPO registration decisions also take a common-sense approach,
endorsing the peaceful co-existence of similar marks in adjacent
markets.312 An example from sports is a case involving AC Milan, yet
another Italian Serie A soccer team from Milan.313 Marriott Hotels had
filed an opposition to the EUTM registration of AC Milan, based on its
ownership of the mark AC Hotels Marriott, including the AC Hotel
Milano.314 The CJEU found no risk of confusion between the two
trademarks, reasoning that the abbreviation AC (an acronym for
“Associazione Calcio” or football club) was descriptive, and that the
two marks conveyed sufficiently different concepts to avoid a public
impression that the two companies are economically linked.315 The
309. Univ. of Ky. v. 40-0, LLC, Opposition No. 91224310, No. 86534269, 2021
TTAB LEXIS 68, at *42 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2021).
310. Id. at *37 (the term “indicat[es] historical or aspirational perfect basketball
seasons, not the source of the T-shirts); see also In re DePorter, 129 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1298,
1302, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 7, *14 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2019) (rejecting as “merely
informational” registration of #MAGICNUMBER108 to express affiliation for the
Chicago Cubs baseball team and their pursuit of a 2016 World Series win 108 years
after their last one).
311. Univ. of Ky. V. 40-0, at *42.
312. For example, the EUIPO allowed Valencia CF, a soccer club in the Spanish
La Liga, to register an updated bat logo for use in all merchandise categories, over
opposition by DC Comics, creators of the Batman superhero, which protested the
similarity. See Valencia and Batman Shake Hands, MARCA (June 6, 2021),
https://www.marca.com/futbol/valencia/2021/06/06/60bc97aeca47415d478b4625.ht
ml (reporting Valencia CF agreed not to use its logo on fictional characters); Mike
Keegan, Holy Trademark! Batman creators DC take on Valencia over logo, BBC
SPORT (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/30143924 (reporting that
Valencia CF had been using the bat logo since 1919, and the City of Valencia has
been associated with bats since a 13th century military battle when one made a
serendipitous appearance).
313. Marriott Worldwide Corp v European Union Intellectual Property Office
(EUIPO) (T-28/18), [2019] E.T.M.R. 46.
314. Marriott Worldwide, ¶ 6.
315. Marriott Worldwide, ¶¶ 51, 95, 104, 116.
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court preserved the use of AC for other soccer clubs in holding that “the
consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in
an analysis of its various details.”316 The ruling reaffirms that likelihood
of confusion analysis should be grounded in the realistic perceptions of
the relevant public, a logic that would permit Inter Miami, Inter Milan,
and soccer clubs worldwide to share use of the descriptive “inter.”317
Second, sports industry mark holders should re-orient their
approach to infringement litigation. The very circularity they have
relied on to expand the property right has now imposed the cost of
hypervigilance and fed a misplaced concern about the risk of a mark
being deemed abandoned. As noted elsewhere, courts have been
“highly forgiving” towards sports trademark owners where an
unauthorized user has claimed abandonment.318 Trademark owners are
not required to sue every single infringer, and “can legitimately take a
cost-effective litigation strategy” that focuses on situations presenting
a significant likelihood of confusion.319 Sports entities are safe in
selectively objecting to uses that actually impose harm, while not
opposing others.320 Instead, sports marks owners could invest in a

316. Marriott Worldwide, ¶ 101; cf. Associazione Calcio Milan SpA v. EUIPO,
T-353/20 (Nov. 11, 2021) (rejecting registration of AC Milan for stationery and office
supplies because of prior registration of Milan in that category).
317. See supra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
318. Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement?, 49
AKRON L. REV. 627, 632 and n. 16 (2016); see, e.g., Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro.
Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship., 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim that
sports team had abandoned its former city-designation by relocating to a new home
city).
319. J. Thomas McCarthy, “Abandonment” by failure to prosecute infringers
in 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 17:17 (5th ed.); see Mark A.
Lemley, Fame, Parody, and Policing in Trademark Law, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1,
10–11 (2019) (arguing that trademark owners should not police against non-infringing
uses like parody, criticism, and non-trademark or nominative use, which don’t
actually violate their rights).
320. See New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F.
Supp. 2d 305, 332, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (NYC Triathlon athletic
event succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunction against unaffiliated use for
athletic equipment even though it had not sued a third party called the New York
Triathlon Club); Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. v. 12th Man/Tennessee LLC, 83
U.S.P.Q.2d 1073, 2007 WL 683778 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (NFL Chicago Bears’ decision
not to sue fan websites that used its name had no relevance to team’s successful
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communication strategy that welcomes all displays and expressions of
sports affiliation while urging consumers to prefer products that
originate from the team.321
For their part, courts should adopt a more consumer-oriented and
free speech-protective approach like that found in a 2021 New York
district court decision permitting an NBA player to use a pop culture
meme in his promotional efforts.322 Boston Celtic player Terry Rozier
had acquired the nickname “Scary Terry” after developing a reputation
around the league as a dangerous scorer.323 He started marketing
clothing featuring the nickname and a cartoon depiction of himself
wearing the “Ghost Face” mask associated with the “Scream” horror
films, without licensing that image from its copyright and trademark
owner.324 In the infringement suit that followed, the court characterized
Rozier’s use as parody, satire, and sufficiently transformative to
establish both a copyright and trademark fair use defense.325
Significantly, the court found Rozier’s use of the image served a niche
market that did not overlap with the Ghost Face owner’s consumer base,
and did not result in any actual consumer confusion.326
Beyond fair use defenses, judicial enforcement of private
trademark rights must defer to the speech-protective limitations
imposed by Tam and Brunetti, just as in the registration context. While
commercial speech, such as trademark, is protected by the First
Amendment, a trademark plaintiff is able to overcome constitutional
limitations when an unauthorized use of its mark is deceptive or

opposition to website registration of mark “12th Bear” for jewelry, clothing, and other
merchandise).
321. See Kugler, supra note 49, at 1925 (noting mixed motives of sports fans
wanting to wear team colors regardless of jersey quality while not wanting to buy
unauthorized products if it cheats an organization to which they are loyal); Tushnet,
supra note 98, at 629 (observing that consumers care about the sponsorship of and are
willing to pay more for official sports memorabilia).
322. Easter Unlimited, Inc. v. Rozier, No. 18-CV-06637 (KAM), 2021 WL
4409729, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021).
323. Rozier, at *5.
324. Rozier, at *8.
325. Rozier, at *78-*79.
326. Rozier, at *69.
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confusing.327 However, to the extent that current trademark laws restrict
more than false or misleading speech, they may be vulnerable to
constitutional attack.328 Dilution laws are most susceptible, given that
they spurn the need to establish consumer confusion, actual economic
harm, or even actual blurring or tarnishing. Especially in the sports
industry, dilution laws have thereby defied historical and cultural norms
for naming teams, and have been used to encroach on other entities’
access to a wide range of words, symbols, slogans, and colors to offer
unrelated goods or services.329 In addition, noncommercial uses of
sports marks in parodies and in fan and media commentary on websites
and elsewhere have been curtailed based on a likelihood of
tarnishing.330 First Amendment challenges to such applications of
trademark law now have a better chance of success, especially where
the challenge amounts to disapproval of expressive content or relies on
vague standards that chill free speech.331
In addition, as Glynn Lunney has suggested332 and as is routinely
the practice in the EU and UK, courts should award reasonable
attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in trademark disputes.333 The
Lanham Act already authorizes this shift in its provision for awarding
reasonable attorney fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.”334
Further congressional authorization for fee-shifting would not be
required if courts redefined “exceptional” to encompass cases that fall
outside trademark’s core zone of protecting purchasers from confusion
327. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 219 (1998).
328. See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 456-57.
329. Glynn Lunney distinguishes between imitation to deceive consumers, and
imitation as competition, the latter of which is desirable because it promotes consumer
welfare. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 21, at 481.
330. See, e.g., supra note 89-94 and accompanying text.
331. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (enjoining film that parodied the Cowboys’ cheerleaders in
part because it was “sexually depraved”); Ramsey, supra note 45, at 460-61 (arguing
that dilution laws cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny).
332. Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1259.
333. See EUTMR Art. 109(1); Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, The
English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public
Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013) (noting that the “English
rule” of loser pays is the norm in most Western legal systems other than the U.S.).
334. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a).
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as to a good’s source.335 So plaintiffs that pursued more esoteric
theories of consumer confusion, such as sponsorship or post-sale
confusion, would risk paying the defendant’s litigation expenses should
they lose.336 Such awards would serve as a deterrent to overly
aggressive enforcement proceedings, as well as an incentive to
trademark defendants to litigate when they otherwise might throw in
the towel.337
Third, members of Congress have more work to do in reforming
the Lanham Act’s constitutionally suspect provisions—before the
Supreme Court does it for them again. While it is unlikely that Congress
will outright repeal the dilution laws, it could amend the statute to
clarify its constitutional parameters and narrow the scope of protection.
The EU Trade Mark Regulations provide a helpful model by
immunizing from infringement liability third party uses that accord
with industry norms or comprise artistic expression, and by expressly
directing the law to be “applied in a way that ensures full respect for
fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of
expression.”338 Accordingly, Congress should elucidate statutory fair
use defenses to include immunity for non-misleading use of words and
symbols in a way that is ornamental, functional, informational, or
culturally significant.339
Congress should also enact an “unjustified threats law,” styled after
the one in the UK, to prevent the misuse of threats to intimidate or gain
an unfair advantage in circumstances where no trademark infringement
has actually occurred.340 Under the UK law, the threat test asks if the
communication would reasonably be understood by a recipient to mean
that someone intends to bring infringement proceedings, and it
encompasses mass communications such as press releases, not just

335. Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1260.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1259.
338. EUTMR Recital 21.
339. See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 467 (advocating for expressly codifying fair
use defenses for comparative advertising, news reporting, consumer product reviews,
teaching, scholarship, criticism, commentary, parody, satire, and other editorial,
educational, literary, or artistic uses).
340. See Intellectual Property (Unjustified Threats) Act 2017, Trade Marks Acts
1994 § 21 et seq.; supra note 197-98 and accompanying text.
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those made to an identified individual.341 A threat is considered
unjustified if the asserted right is not infringed or is invalid.342 The
claimant in a threats action can seek a declaration that the threats lacked
justification, damages, and an injunction to prevent further threats.343
Applied to the sports industry, the availability of such relief raises the
stakes for a trademark owner in sending cease-and-desist letters in
many of the cases described herein. It would inhibit trademark
enforcement overreach and resolve some of the asymmetries and
neglect of consumer welfare in trademark litigation.344
CONCLUSION
The greater distance we have traveled from traditional trademark,
the greater harm to consumer welfare, competitive markets, and free
expression. Overprotection of trademark also imposes costs on the
trademark system itself, as it becomes the tool of bullies who use it to
serve only corporate interests, to the detriment of the public interest.
The sports industry offers a stark example of this phenomenon, as the
originator of the merchandising right and one of the most aggressive
exponents of proprietary rights over words, symbols, colors, and
popular phrases. Despite how small the benefit derived from any one
enforcement scenario, sports mark owners have insisted on excluding
even non-trademark uses that pose no realistic threat of consumer
confusion.
This trademark aggression is not without cost to the sports mark
owners themselves, squandering goodwill and exposure opportunities,
overspending on litigating the boundaries of their trademarks and on
establishing new marks, and grappling with the increasing linguistic
scarcity they helped create. Developments in the US and abroad, and
the example of EU and UK trademark laws, recommend calling a
timeout on this strategy. It would better serve sports mark owners to
reallocate trademark protection budgets to help clear out the deadwood
341. Trade Marks Act 1994 § 21.
342. Trade Marks Act 1994 § 21A.
343. Trade Marks Act 1994 § 21C.
344. Glynn Lunney has analogously advocated to amend the Lanham Act to
recognize a strategic lawsuit against competition (SLAC) defense—and a
corresponding motion to strike—for all trademark defendants, akin to a SLAPP
statute. See Lunney, Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution, supra note 34, at 1270-71.
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from the federal trademark registry and reorient consumer expectations
to allow for displays and expressions of sports affiliation that don’t
necessarily originate from the team. As a dominant force in the
commodification of trademark, they are best situated to restore a
balance that respects consumer interests and facilitates competitive
markets.
Other actors—namely regulators, courts, and Congress—have an
opportunity to redirect trademark law with new strategies for
registration, adjudication, and legislation. Trademark examiners should
internalize the import of the Trademark Modernization Act and recent
Supreme Court decisions with a more speech-protective approach to
registration and cancellation. Courts should similarly heed that message
in considering whether legal prohibition is justified for a range of
allegedly infringing or diluting uses that cause minimal or irrelevant
confusion, where enforcement would inhibit market entry, free
expression, and access to cultural capital. And Congress should enact
countermeasures to deal with trademark overprotection, including
clarifying available defenses, enacting a cause of action to deter and
punish bullies, and reciting the societal values at stake.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss2/4

66

